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ABSTRACT
Since Ricardos nineteenth-ce ntury suggestion that the meal'S offi nancing govern ment spending is
irrelevant, the oreti cal deb ate concerning the burd en of government debt has been vigorous
(Leachman 1996: 695) . The effect of nation al debt on rea l eco nomic act iv ity has been a rec urring
topic in eco nomic litera tu re. wit h the problem usuall y stated as fo llows: "for a given level of
government spendi ng, is the economy sensitive to the fin ancing mix between tax and debt ? "
(Carmic hae l 1982: 202) . "Ricardian equivalence ". as the revived theory has come to be called .
attri butes no effects at all: in other words. the de bt/tax mix is irrelevant (Seater 1993: 142 ).
Taxation and debt finance (issuing bonds) ma y therefore be an equivalent means o f financ ing
government expendi ture (Hoover 1988: 139).
The fol lowing dissertati on is concerned with the analy sis o f Ricardi an equiva lence theory. The
ana lysi s en gages both macroeconom ic and microeconornic theor y and co ncludes with an empirica l
ana lysi s of Ricard ian eq uiva lence usin g So uth African da ta . We study the effects of changes in
taxes on the macro econo my , Th e maj or finding is that the Dalam agas result suppo rting Ricardi an
equiva lence is not reproduced . In the final eco nometric ana lysis we find that governme nt
expend iture and private expend iture are hardl y close substi tutes and indi viduals do not full y
inco rporate future tax liabiliti es into curren t dec isions , Based on these results, the ab ility of
government to influence output us ing fiscal pol icy adjustmen t is limited only to the ex te nt that





Dav id Ricardo (1772-1832) made important contributions to explaining a host of econo m ic
probl ems and iss ues. ra ng rng fr om the va lue of mo ney to the th eory o f va lue. ex change. and
int ernati onal trade. and laid the foundati on s o f mod ern public finance theory (Park in 1990: 904).
Theoretical as it is. much of Ricard os work has practi cal im plications . Hi s contributio n that has
most re levance fo r us today. however. is that co nce rning the public debt and on what has co me to
be called Ricardi an equivalence.
Since the appearanc e of large governme nt bud get deficits in the late 1970's. there ha s been
continued co nc ern that th ese deficits cau se high er real int erest rate s. Iow sav ing and low rates of
economic gro wth. Standard Ke ynesian and N eo-c lass ical model s provide theoreti cal justificati on
fo r thi s beli ef if deficits are fund ed by the pri va te sec tor and not monetised. More recentl y.
however. the Ric ardian equi valence hypothesis has received increasing atte ntion.
Rica rdian equivalence offers a unique persp ecti ve on budget defi cits. w hich takes the positi on that
neither deficits nor the way they are financed are cr ucial to econo m ic po licy and future econo m ic
prosperi ty . T he basic th eor y indicates that for a given path of government spend ing . a deficit-
fin an ced cut in current taxes lead s to high er future taxes that have the sa me present va lue as the
initial cut (Barro 1989: 39). The re fore the substitution o f a budget defi cit for cu rrent tax es (or an y
othe r rearran gem ent of the timing o f taxes ) has no impact on th e aggreg ate demand for go ods . In
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thi s sense, budge t deficits and taxat ion have equivalent effects on the eco nomy -- henc e the term
"Ricardian Equivalence Theorem ".
1.2 Research Objective
The objective of th is econo mic study is to offer bo th a theoreti cal and an empirical analys is of
Ricardi an equivalence. The rese arch objec tive is firstly, to locate Ricardian equivalenc e with in the
macroeconomic debate co ncerning bud get deficit s and to develop an und erstanding of the or igins
of this theory. The second objective is to develop an und erstanding of the behaviour of Ricard ian
individuals within the m icroeconomi c context o f intertern por al choice. Th e final object ive o f this
study is to pro vide empirical testing for Ricardian equiva lence usin g So uth African data. In testing
for Ricardian equiva lence one eithe r gets support for the theor y or not, depending on min or
changes in model specification, and this thesi s will attem pt to see if thi s is the case . Different tests
and different time periods (e.g. annua l as opposed to quarte rly) are utili sed in thi s study for test ing
for Ricardian eq uivalence, which may lead to differe nt conc lusio ns with respect to the existence of
Ricardian equivalence behav io ur amo ngs t So uth African consumers.
1.3 Research Method
The research meth od in th is study is o r both a seconda ry and primary nature. Seconda ry material is
obtained primar ily from books and journa ls. The pr imary research is und ert aken using quantitative
methods. The quantitative meth ods invol ved an econometr ic st udy using South African
inacroeconomic data (19 46 - 1( 98). The data in Empi rical Ana lys is A was processed using the
SHAZA A;J 8. () Vers ion econo me trics computer package. We add to Dalamagas ' s ( 1994)
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econometric test by co nd ucting joint tests o f impli ed theoretical restri ction s. usin g expanded sets o f
econo mic va riables for calculating expe cted outcomes.
lA Study Outline
Following on from this introductory chapter. Cha pter 2 cove rs the macroeconomic debate
conce rru ng Ricardian equivalence and budget deficits. Chapt er 3 presents a micro-economic
perspect ive of the Rica rd ian equiva lence probl em so as to develop an und erstanding of the
behavioural characteristi cs of the Ricardian consume r. Chapter 4 cons iders certa in key
assumptions regardin g Ricard ian equiva lence and the curre nt cri ticism of Ricardi an theory.
Having est abli shed the theoretical basi s for Rica rdian equivalence the ory. an empirical study is
und ertaken in Chapter 5 to test for ev ide nce in support of the Ricardian equivalence theory
discusse d in the previous cha pters. The standard eco nometric model is initially considered and then
an examination of previou s eco nometric research is und ertaken with respect to Ricardian
Equiva lence to place the empirica l analys is component of this thesis in context.
The spec ifie framework 0 I'analys is is deta i led and the Dalamagas ( 1994) model. as the basis of the
empirical testin g, is examined. Dalamagass econometric approach is appl ied to two differin g
emp irical analyse s using extended data ranges for South A frica . From the theoretical analys is and
the observa tions made in the empirica l section the thesis is concluded wi th a summary and
conclusi ons chapt er which alludes to the rele vance of Ricardi an Equivalence in the South African
situation and the irregul arities that may result from empirical testing.
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CHAPTER TWO
BUDG ET DEFICITS AND RICARDIAN EQU IVALENCE - A MACROECONOMIC
DEBATE
2.1 Introduction
Histori cally. atte ntion has focused on the question of whether or not ind ividuals perceive
gove rnment bonds as net wea lth. with the link between wealth and real activity being taken as
given. This question has dominated contemporary macroec onomi c thou ght and has generated a
co nsiderable amount of research as investigators seek to explain the pri vate sec tor's response to
governmental behaviour (Darius 200 1: 49) . The mod els that are commonl y tested are associated
with the Keynesian , the 1 eo-c lass ica l and the Ricard ian equiva lence paradi gm s with respect to the
influence of bud get defi cits .
Before ana lysi ng the natu re of Ricardi an equiva lence behaviou r. the economic effect s of deficits
and gove rnme nt debt are discussed in this chapt er. Th e macroec onomic debate concerning budget
defi cit s is discussed in relation to the three main paradi gms concerning budget deficits . Finall y. the
IS-LM framework is used to demonstrate Ricardian equi valence showing the relation ship between
bud get deficits. mo ney dem and and interest rate s.
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2.2 Budget Deficits
The budget and especially the budget deficit is a major preoccupation of
economic policy. and thus
is often the main feature of fiscal poli cy debates (Dornbusch and Fisch
er 1996: 120: Miller 1982 :
266) . Such so-c alled fiscal policy con sists o f deliberate changes in gov
ernment spending and tax
collections to achi eve full employment. control infl ation. and enco urag
e economic growth (Brue
and McConnel 2002 : 224) . Governments use budgets to control and re
cord thei r fiscal affairs. A
bud get shows. for a given year. the planned expenditures and expecte
d receipts that government
spending and tax programs would yield . The budget typically will
contain a list of specific
programs (education. welfare. defence. etc .), as well as tax sources (ind
ividual income tax. social-
insurance taxes. etc .) (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1989: 385 ). In a giv
en year. governments run
either bud get ary surpluses or bud getary deficits .
What exactly is the bud get deficit? The go vernment's budget surplu
s or deficit is simply the
difference between the tax es it receives and its total expenditure in a g
iven peri od of time. which
we refer to as the budget balance (Parkin J990 : 892) . The governmen
t' s budget balance can be
defined spec ifi cally as its total tax revenue (T) minus its total expenditu
res. i.e. T -- (G -+ Q). where
the governme nt' s total expenditure ((l + Q) is divided between expenditu
re on final goods and
serv ices. G. and exp enditure on transfer payments. Q (Lipsey et al 1987: 570 : Lipsey
1989 : 4(8) .
When this equation takes on a zero value. the budget is sa id to be balan
ced. and tax revenu es j ust
balanc e total expenditures . When the va lue is positi ve. the government
's bud get is in surplus. and
there is an excess of tax revenue over expenditures. Finall y. when th
e value is a negative. the
governme nt' s budget is in deficit and there is an excess expenditure
over tax revenue (Lip sey
1989: 498).
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Rising budget de ficits in both de veloped and develop ing co untries
have received co nside rable
atte ntion over more recent decades and therefore have been con sid ered
a key economic issue. often
second only to employ ment (G upta 1992: 19. Bernheim 198 9 : 55).
Man y econo mists and other
ob servers refer to defi cit s as being harmful to wo rle! eco no mies by cau
sin g high real interest rates.
low savi ng. low rates of econo mic gro wth and large current-account
defi cit s. Harvard economist
Benjamin Friedman ( 1988) summa rizes the concern when he write
s . "We are li ving 'we ll by
running up our deb t and se lling offour assets. America has thro wn itse
lfa party and hilled the tab
10 the future . The costs, which are only beginn ing to come du e, will
include a lower standard of
liv ing/or individual Americans and reduce d American influence and i
mportance in world affairs "
(Friedman edi ted in Yell en 1989 : 17).
The cris is sce nario described by Friedman ( 1988) above has, however,
been difficult to maintain in
the face of robust performance of the eco nomy of the United State
s in the 19805 and 199 0s.
Despi te its co nsi derable defi cit . the eco nomy featured high averag e
growth rate s of real GN P.
declining unemploym ent. mu ch lower infl ation. a sharp decrease in n
ominal interest rates. so me
decline in ex pected rea l int ere st rates and high va lues of real investmen
t ex penditures (Barro 1989 :
37). Thus. while fiscal adj ustme nt is co mmo nly regarded as the cor
ner stone of macroecon omic
stabilisation, the ac tua l im pact o f lowe r public defi cit s on national sav
ing and the current ac co unt
ba lance remains both theoretically and empir ica lly co ntroversia l (Lo pe
z et al 20 00 : 226) .
In his speech on the budget and ent it leme nts at Bryn Mawr Colleg
e in December 1993. then
Presid ent Bill C linton declared that "high deficit s keep interest rat e
s high. and they crowd out
private demands for cap ital, " and with the passage of thi s bud get. "the
markets had itfigured 0 111.
That 's why interest rates are dOl 1'11 ami investment is up. ,. Presid ent C l
into n was correct. but onl y
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to the ex tent that he chose to anal yse and describe the effects o
f the standard Keynesian
macroeconomi c mo del (Savage 1994: (8). It is clear. however. that not
all eco nomists agree with
the Keynesian model or with Clintons interpretation of the de ficit's eff
ect on interest rate s. There
are three main schoo ls of thou ght co nce rning the eco nomic effec ts o f b
ud get deficits: Keynesian.
Neo- class ica l and Ricard ian . The basic structure and implication s of eac
h model will be considered
below.
2.3 The Keynesian Model
A traditional the ory of bud get defi cit s. which appears in most tex tbook
s. holds that an increase in
governme nt debt leads to an incre ase in private sector wea lth. Adhere
nts of th is view argue that
the increase in wea lth. in turn. leads to an increase in the price level
, output and interest rates
(Wheeler 1999: 274) . The starting point in explaining the tradition
al perspecti ve can be the
assumption that the substitution or a bud get defi cit for current taxat ion
leads to an ex pansion of
aggregate consumer dem and (Bernheim 1989: 6 1; Vamv oukas 1999: 66) . In
other words. because
desired private saving rises by only a frac tion or the budge t deficit/tax c
ut. desired national sav ing-
the sum of public and pri vate savi ng. declines.
In a closed economy it fo llows that the ex pec ted real inte rest rate wou
ld have to rise to es tablish
eq ua lity between desired national sav ing and inves tme nt de ma nd. Th
e higher real interest rate
cro wd s out investment. which shows up in the long run as a smalle r s
tock of productive capital.
and hence lowers productiv ity (Bar ro 1996: ( 1). This standard the
ory thu s implies a close
relationship between a country' s deficit s. real intere st rates. and levels o
f inves tment.
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In an open economy with per fect markets for goo ds and credit each co
untry face s the same real
interest rate. whic h is de termined by the world aggregates of investm
ent dem and and desired
sav ing . In the stand ard analysis. the home country' s decision to substitute
a bud get deficit for taxes
normally leads to increased international bor rowin g. rather than to a high
er real interest rate. That
is. bud get deficits lead to current acco unt deficit s (Barro 1989 : 37).
Expected real interest rates. only rise for the home country if that co
untry is large enough to
influence wo rld markets. or if the increased national debt induces foreign
lend ers to demand higher
expected returns on the country's obligations. Therefore for an open eco
nomy. it can be said that
there is a much weaker tendency for a single country's bud get de fici t to
be asso ciated with higher
real interest rates or reduced domest ic investm ent (Barro 1996: 92). Ho
wever . if the ent ire world
run s bud get defic its, then real interest rates rise on international capital m
ark ets. and investment is
crowded out in eac h country. Correspondingly. the world's stoc k of ca
pital is lower in the long
run and these effects for the wo rld parallel the stand ard ones for a single c
losed eco nomy.
The Keynes ian model has been associated with this Neo-class ica l mo
del and is based on the
argument that the approach is relevant in the shor t run (i.e. temporary
defi cits ). while the Neo-
classical approach is concerned with the long run (i .e. permanent de
fi cit s) (Darius 200 I : 50;
Bernheim 1989 : 59) . The Keynesians ass ume the ex istence of unempl oy
ed resources and that the
eco nomy contains a large popul at ion of liquidity-constrained indi viduals
. The seco nd ass umption
impli es sens itivi ty of consu mption to changes in contemporaneo us income
(Darius 2001: 50) .
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2.4 The Neo-classical Model
According to Bernheim ( 1989: 57), the standard Neo -c lass ica l model i
s premi sed on three main
ass umptions :
• Firstly, the consumption of eac h individual is determined as
the solution to an
intertemporal optimisatio n problem ruled by the market rate of interest.
• Second ly, indi viduals' life spans are cons ide red finite.
• Thirdly, market clearing is assumed to take place in all periods.
The basic Neo-classical model. like the Keynesian mod el discussed abo
ve, support s the view that
subs titution of a bud get deficit for current taxation will increase consump
tion, and personal savi ngs
will not increase to offs et public sector savings (Darius 2001: 50) . Such
models thus ass ume that
agg regate consumption is higher. and national sav ing (private and pu
bli c) is lower, if a giv en
gov ern ment spending program is finance d through the issuing of bond s r
ather than through current
taxat ion (Yellen 1989:18).
If resources are full y employed. so that output is fixed, higher curre nt co
nsumption impli es an
equa l and offse tti ng reduction in other forms of spending. With dom esti
c savings on the decline in
a closed econom y, the equilibrating rate of interest between investment
and savings would have to
increase in order to maintain equilibr ium in the capital market. The
increase in interest rates
crowds out dom estic investm ent. leading to a dec line in long-term capi
tal accumulation, and thus
to an eve ntua l reduction in the long-term steady growth rate (Dar ius 200 1
: 50).
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Diam on d ( 1965: 1126), who was one of the first to study form all y the e ffects of budget defici ts in
the context of th is mod el. argued that "ex terna l debt " (b udget defi cit s) reduces the utilit y o f an
individual livin g in lon g-run eq uilibrium. Diam ond (196 5). who focuse d on permanent rather than
temporary deficit changes. indicated that a permanent incre ase in the ratio of do mestica lly held
de bt to nation al income reduces the steady state ca pita l- labo ur ratio (Bern heim 1989 : 57 ).
Co ns umers are unw illing to hold the or ig ina l vo lume of capital and bonds (including the new
bonds) at the or ig ina l rate of inte res t. Risin g intere st ra tes increase the level of savin g. reducing
investment . until capital mark et equi libri um is re-e stablished. Persi stent government deficits thu s
crowd out pri vate capital acc umulatio n.
Ye llen ( 198 9: 18) argues that one m ust co ns ide r that there are two distinct mechan ism s by which.
crowding out occurs . In a closed econo my. a change from tax to defi cit financing raises real
inter est rates and crowds out investme nt. In co ntrast. in the case of smalle r open econom ies. wi th
internation all y mob ile ca pi ta l, net ex ports rather than domesti c investment are crowd ed out.
Defi cit s place upward pressure on interest rates. inducing an inflow of for eign funds. With flexible
exchange rates. an influx of capital ca uses an appreci ati on of the country's currency. which
dimini shes the competitiveness of its products in world markets. In large open economies . both
these mechan ism s are likely to be in op eration.
The mechani sm by whic h crowdi ng out occurs and the implicati on s fo r futur e livin g standa rds are
iden tical in both cases. De fic its retard do mest ic capital for ma tion and shift the eco nomy to a
growth path with lower per capita output and ca pita l per wo rke r than in a closed eco nomy
scena rio . In the ope n economy scenario. current account de fic its cau se a growing level of forei gn
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ind ebtedness. resulting in a burden of future interes t paym ents. which w
ill decrease the di sposabl e
income of domestic resid ent s (Yellen 1989: 18) .
2.5 The Ricardian Equivalence Model (New view of the deficit)
Over the last 25 years, the two theoretical models discu ssed above
have been cast into doubt
thr ough the revi val of a theory. fir st expl ored by Ric ardo, suggesting t
hat debt poli cy has none of
the effects attributed to it by tradit iona l analysis (Seater 1993:
142). Tobin (1952) asked
rhetoricall y : " How is it possible that society merely by the dev ice of
incurring debt to itself can
deceive itse lfinto believing that it is wealthier? Do not the additiona l ta
xes 'which are necessary to
cony out the interest charges reduce the value ofother compo nents ofpriva
te wealth? There must
certainly be effects in this dire ction. " (Poterba and Summers 1987: 3
69). The centra l Ric ardi an
observa tion is therefore that defi cit s merely postp one taxes and that a r
ational individua l should be
ab le to see th rou gh the inte rte mporal ve il and reali se that the presen
t discounted value of taxes
depends only upon real government spendi ng - not on the preci se mix
of deb t and taxes by which
purchases are financed (Bernhe im 1989: (3) .
Barro ( 1996: 93) explains that co nsume r demand depends on the a
nticipated present va lue of
addit iona l future taxes. In other words . eac h person subtracts his or he
r sha re of the present va lue
of futu re taxes from the present va lue or ex pected incom e. to determine a net wealth positi on .
which then determ ines the des ired leve l orco nsumption. Since a budget deficit does not affect the
present va lue of taxes, it must therefore have no impact on co nsume
r demand. Another way to
express this res ult is that a decrease in pu blic saving (implied by an
increase in the governme nt
defi cit) induces an equa l offse tt ing increase in private savi ng. thus g
overnme nt deficit s are not
16
viewe d as net wealth by the private sector because the present va lue of implied future tax liabil ities
is equal to the value of debt (Fe lds te in and Elmendor f 1990: 589; Gulley 1994 : 239) .
The Ricardi an modi fica tion of the standard analys is begins with the propositi on that if the path of
government expenditures on goods. serv ices . and transfers is unchanged . then a deficit-financ ed
tax cut or the issuing of bond s leads to an exac tly o ffsetting increase in the present value of future
taxes (Barro 1989: 38; Evans \ 988 : 983). Thi s result follow s from the gove rnment's budget
constraint, which equate s total expenditure for each period (including inte rest payment s) to
revenues from taxation or other sources and the net issue of interest-bearing public debt. Barro
( 1996 : 93) argues "There is no F ee lunch: the government must pay for its expenditures noli' or
later: hut not never. ,.
Economic agents will realise that the rising publi c debt must be repaid at some point in the future.
and, in anticipation. they will save their additio nal incom e afte r taxes so as to meet future tax
hikes. Under these circumstances taxation and debt finan ce (issuing bonds) can be see n as
equiva lent means of financing governme nt ex penditure . If the government levies a tax. it reduces
private sec tor wealth, and if it sells bonds instead to the same va lue of the tax. to be paid off with
interest. wealth remains intact (Hoover 1988: 139). This is so because the government will have to
raise taxes late r in orde r to pay off the bond s with interest. Dissaving by the government should
therefo re be fully compen sated by increased private sector sav ings . and the creati on of government
de bt has none of the effects pred icted by either Keynesian or Neo-c lass ica l theory, ass uming GD P
is consta nt (i.e. changes in the price level. output or interest rate) (Allers et al 1998: 566; Wheeler
1999: 274) .
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Barro (1 99 6: 93) ex plains that cons ume r demand depends o n the antic
ipated present value of taxes.
In other wo rds , eac h person subtracts his or her share of the present va
lue from th e present va lue of
income, to determine a net wea lth position . which then determ
ines the de sired level of
consumption. Since a bu dget de fic it does not affect the present valu
e of taxes, it must therefore
ha ve no impact on consume r demand. Anothe r way to ex press thi
s result is that a decrease in
public sav ing (im plie d by an increas e in the government deficit) i
nduces an equally offsetti ng
inc rease in pri vate saving . thus govern ment deficits are not viewed
as net wealth by the pri vate
secto r becau se the present va lue of im plied futur e tax liabilities is
equa l to the valu e o f debt
(Darius 200 1: 50; Fe lds tein and Elmendo rf 1990 : 589; Gull ey 1994 : 2
39).
Whe n cons idering the closed economy situation. it is noted th at the de
sired nati on al saving mu st be
equated to domestic investm en t demand . [f the Ricardian result is corr
ec t (so that the budget defi cit
has no effect on de sired national savi ng ). then the real interest rat e
does not have to change to
maintain the equali ty between desired nat ional saving and domestic
inve stment demand (Barro
1996 : 93). Therefor e, in the case of the clo sed economy. the budget de
ficit has no effect on the real
interest rate or qua ntity of investm ent. In an open economy. the curren
t-account balan ce equa ls the
excess of de sired national sav ing over dom estic investment demand . F
rom a Ricardian perspecti ve
it has been obse rve d th at a budget deficit does not affec t desired nati on
al savi ng and therefore do es
not affec t the current-account balance. Tha t is. bud get defi cits do
not cau se cur rent-account
defi cits. T he re is no need to borrow from abroad becau se desired p
ri vate saving from dom estic




A simple IS'-LM fram ework can be used to demonstrate the relationship betw
een budget defic its,
money demand and interest rates, in a ll three models discu ssed abo ve (G
uIley 1994 : 239). The IS-
I.M model , invented by the eco nomist John Hick s, is the simplest m
odel that inte grat es the
monetary-ass et side of the eco nomy with the real expenditure side (L
ipsey 1989 : 546) . The LAI
relati on is derived from the equilibrium conditi on that the demand f
or money, L - ' liquidity' ,
should equa l the ex isting quant ity of mon ey, 1'1'1. - hence the nam e LM (Ke nned
y 1984: 128; Lipsey
1989 : 546 : Parkin 1990: 782). The curve therefore plots national in
come against the rate of
interest.
The IS relation shows all combinations or income, Y. and the rate of inte
rest. r, at which 1 = S. that
is, at which planned investment is equal to plann ed sav ings (Glahe 197
3 : 113: Lipsey et al 1987 :
768: Lipsey 1989: 556). The I,\"~ curve. often referred to as the goods ma
rket equilibrium schedule,
therefore shows the combinations of Y and r that give equilibrium in the go
ods markets. whereas
the LM curve shows the combination or Y and r that give equilibrium in asset
markets (Dornbusch
and Fischer 1996 : 129 ; Lips ey 1989 : 556). The only combination w
here both mark ets are in
equilibrium. that is the unique point or overall equilibrium. occurs whe
re the two curves intersect
(Cobham 1987 : 7).
This simple framework can be effectively used to demonstrate the re
lationship between budget
deficits. money demand and interest rates in the Keynesian. Neo-class
ical and Ricardian models
(Gulley 1994 : 239) . The effect of incorporating a gove rnment bud get c
onstraint into the standard
IS-LM model was first examined by On and Ott (1965) and Chri st (1968) (
Vane and Thompson
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1992: 114). The argument considers that if we assume the ex treme
case of a self-co ntained
eco nomy that is not growing ove r time. long-run equilibrium is not possi
bl e if the re is a continuin g
budge t deficit. This is because in orde r to finance the de fic it the autho
rities would have to issue
either bonds or money, in which case the supply of financial assets woul
d change, disturbing stock
equilibrium . Long-run equilibrium requires a gove rnment bud get tha
t is balanced (Vane and
Thompso n 1992: 114).






(Source : Vane and Thompson 1992.. 115)
Co nsider Figure A. The top panel depicts the norm al IS-L M model,
whereas the lower panel
represent s the governme nt budget posit ion determined by the relat ion
ship between gove rnment
expend iture and tax revenue.
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To simplify the analysis, government ex pe nd iture (G) is assumed to b
e indep endent of income (Y)
(he nce the hor izontal line) while tax rev enues (7) increase as income in
crea ses. Th e slope of the
tax functi on repres ents the marginal rate of tax (I ) and is thus ass um ed
to be con stant. In Figure A.
positi ve valu es occur on either side of th e horizontal axis, i.e. po siti
ve rates of int erest up wards.
and positi ve va lues of gov ernme nt exp end iture and tax revenue downw
ards fro m O.
We begin from a position of lon g-run full stock equilibrium at an inco
me level Yo(the intersection
of ISo and LMo), w ith a balan ced govern me nt budget, i.e . Go = To, at inc om e l
evel Yo. An increase
in government ex pe nditure shifts th e /5,' curve outwards to the rig
ht from ISo to IS I and the
government expenditure func tio n do wn wards from Go to G,. At an inc
ome level of Y1 (the
int ersecti on of IS, and LMo). there is a budget de fic it equal to AB. The rest
oration of full stock
equilibrium requires income rising to Y.? suc h that govern me nt tax revenue
equals the increased
government expe nditure, thereby closi ng the budget de fici t and restor
ing budgetary balan ce (Vane
and Tho mpson 1992 : 115).
By co ntras t if we co ns ide r a tax-cut induced increase in the deficit. ceteris pa
ribus, the IS curve
wi ll shift outwards to the rig ht from ISoto ISI and the government ex pe nd iture
funct ion down wards
from Goto G, (it must be noted that the slope of the tax fun cti on represents the
margin al rate of tax
(I) and it is ass ume d co ns tant in Fig ure A) . Standa rd ana lys is (i.e . K
e yn esian and Neo-classi cal)
argues that mon ey demand increases via an inc rease in con sumption (
for transaction purposes ) and
an increase in saving (for sto re-o f-wealth purposes). Furthe r, if mo ne y
demand is also a fun ct ion of
wealth. the increased holdings of govern me nt bonds wi ll raise mo
n ey de mand as well. These
increases in mon ey demand will occur as lon g as the private secto r d
oes not fully di scount future
tax liabil it ies resulting from the new debt. T he short-run adj ustme nt
process will tend to increase
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real interest rate s (Gulley 1994: 240) . The long-run adjustment pro cess
in the Neo-class ica l model
will leave output unchanged, w hile in the Keynesian model output will r
ise.
The re-est ablishment of full stock equilib rium requ ires that incom
e n ses to Y2 such that
gov ernment tax revenue equa ls the incre ased gove rnment expenditure,
thereb y clo sin g the budget
deficit and restoring budge tary balanc e (Vane and Thompso n 1992: 1
15). The establishment of
equilibrium at Y.:> can be related to the wealth effects on consumption a
nd the demand for money.
Where an increase in gov ernme nt expenditure is financed through the s
ale of bonds, pr ivate sector
holdi ngs of bonds will increase as long as the bud get deficit per sists. If
the assumption is that the
wealth effect on consumption (w hich sh ifts the IS curv e further outward s
to the right ) is stronger
than that on the dem and for mone y (which shifts the LM curve upwards to the
left ) the level o f
income rises and long-run equilibrium will be re-established whe n the
bud get is balanced at an
income level of Y2. However. if the wealth effect on demand for mo
ney outweighs that on
consumption, then . althoug h the immediate impact of increased gover
nme nt ex penditure will be
ex pansionary (i .e. incom e will init ially rise from Yo to Y,), in the long run
the equilibrium will
continually decrease and the budget defi cit will increase. bec ause as the
income fall s tax revenues
also fall. Vane and Thompson (1992 : 11 6) arg ue that in this case income
will be continually dri ven
further away from its lon g-run equilibrium income level ( Y.:» and there w
ill be instability in the
model .
An objection to the pred ictions co nce rn ing the power of fiscal po licy ca
n be made on the gro unds
of rat ional ity - ' Ricardian cqui valence ' . The basis o f this view. as previ
ou sly discussed, is that the
private sec tor will real ise that increased bond issues will necessitate f
uture increases in taxes 10
meet interest payments on the bond s (Vane and Thompson 1992: I 17).
In the Ricardi an model. the
value of new debt is seen simply as the present value of future tax liabil
ities. Thus, when ' debt' is
issued. the private sector will hold the debt and private saving will inc
rease by an equal amount
(Gulley 1994 : 240 ). Ricardian equiva lence states that as demand shifts o
ut, the supply of loanable
fund s will also shift to the point where inte rest rate has remained unch
anged (Winner 1993: 81).
The shifts in demand and supp ly there fore counterbalance eac h other. T
hi s shows that the interest
rate hold s constant and we remain at Yo in the diagram under Ricardian Equi
valence.
Thus. in the IS-LM model. the Ricardi an equivalence hypo the sis denotes that t
he rise of the budget
deficit does not influenc e the equilibrium of the I,c..,' and LM curves. In th is
way, the government
deficit does not affect th e equilibrium level of the national incom e, inte
re st rate, money demand .
consumption, savings or investm ent (Va mvo ukas 1999: 67) . The i
mp act of an increase in
governme nt expenditure wo uld thus also be the same. whether financed
by an incre ase in taxe s or
bond sales, in the Ricardian case.
2.7 Conclusion
Since the appearance of large gove rnment budge t deficits in the la
te I970s, there has been
continued conce rn that these de ficits cause higher real interest rates. Io
w sav ing and low rates of
eco nomic growth. Standard Keynesian and Neo-class ical models provi
de theoreti cal justifi cation
for this belief. More recentl y. however. the Ricardi an equiva lence
hypothesis has received
increasin g atte ntion.
After introducing Ricardi an equiva lence in Chapter 1. Ricardi an equ
ivalence is placed III the
theoret ical context of budget deficits in this chapter - the aim bein g t
o locate Ricardi an theor y
within the macroeconomic debate co ncerning the economic effects of budget deficit s and the way
they are financed .
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CHAPTER THREE
RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE - A MICROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
3.1 Introduction
"Barros (197 -1) argument is a modern restatement l?( David Ricarda 's equivalence theorem. As
fo rmulated by Ricardo. equivalence It 'OS 0 matt er ofpresent value arithmetic. Barr o converted (111
arithmetical proposition into one with behavioural content by assuming that present taxpayers will
treat their heirs as extensions ofthemselves " (Vaughn and Wagn er 1992: 42 ).
In this chapter an attempt is mad e to explain Ricardian equi valence by trying to understand certain
behavioural chara cteristi cs of indi vidual con sumers over time. In this respect Barros modelling of
Ricardi an equivalence is analysed within the microeconomic context of intertemporal choice.
Critical but oft en controve rsial assumptions required for the operation of the Ric ardi an equivalence
model will also be identified in thi s chapter. Finally, relevant criticisms facing Ricardian
equivalence theory will be discussed before the empirical analysi s of this theory in Chapter 4 .
3.2 Intertcmporal Choice
Ricardi an equivalence is essentia lly about con sumption decisions over time, and in order to mod el
these deci sions we utili se interternp oral choic e theory. Thus . alth ough Ricardian equi valence is
basically a macroec onomic phenomenon. it doe s have a microeconomic basis. Intertemporal
choice. simply stated, refers to con sumption of choices over time (Varian 1993: 179). In order to
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model Ricardian equiva le nce with respect to intert emporal choice. for
this purpose. we need to
make a few simplistic ass umptions :
.I. The con sumer chooses how mu ch ofa goo d to co nsume in each period (C l. ("2)
2. The price o f a consumption goo d in each period is co nstant
3. The amo unt of money income the consume r has in each period is ( 171
). 1712)
4. The only way to transfer money from period I to period 2 is by savin
g witho ut earn ing interest
5. There is no possib ility of borrowin g money, so the most the consum
e r can spend in period I IS
JJlj
3.2.1 The Budget Con straint
An economic problem facin g the . intertemporal consumer is to fi
nd out how to ma xumse
cons umer sa tisfactio n. In orde r to do so. we co nsult not only ou
r preferenc es - given by
indi fferen ce curves - but also our opportunit ies - give n by our available
income. ca lled our bud get
cons trai nt (M iller 1982: 434). Th e consumer wo uld like to cons ume la
rge quantitie s of almos t all
desirable co mmodi ties. but. un fortunately. the indivi dual's incom e lim
its how much he/she can
spend and he/she therefore has to make choices or trade-offs amo ng pos
sible goods (G lahe and Lee
1989: 126: M ille r 1982: 434) . Eac h indi vidual thus has a bud get co nst
ra int, which limits his/her
ability to co nsume in light of the prices he/she must pay for va rious g
oo ds and services (Pind yk
and Rubinfeld 1998: 72) .
The bud get co nstra int can be assumed to be found when the rate of
intere st is at zero and no
borrowing is allowed. and thu s the less the indiv idua l cons umes in perio
d 1 the more the cons umer
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can con sume in period 2. Relaxing the fourth assumption above, the
con sumer can now borrow
and lend money at the same interest rate r. and keeping prices of con
sumption in eac h period
constant at 1. we can thus deri ve the bud get cons tra int. One can suppose
that the consumer decid es
to be a saver so his first peri od consumption C l. is less than his fir st perio
d incom e, mi. In this case.
interest will be earned on the amount saved, m , - C l, at the interest rate r
. The amount that can be
consumed in the next period is thu s given by:
C2= m2 + (ml - Cl ) + rtm, - cd
= 1712 + ( 1 + r )(m I - Cl )
( 1)
(2)
Thi s says that the amo unt the consumer can consume in period 2 is his in
come added to the amount
he/she saved fro m period 1, added to the interest that he/she saved on savings
(Varian 1993: 180).
We can arrange the bud get constraint for the consume r into two alte rna ti
ve forms:
(l + r ) C l + C2 = (1+ r ) 171 1 + 1112
Or
Cl + (C2 / 1 + r) = 111 1 + (1112 / 1 + r ).
(3)
(4)
Equation 3 ex presses the bud get co nstraint in term s of future va lues an
d equa tion 4 expresses the
budget co nstra int in terms of prese nt va lues . Th e first budget constrain
t makes the pri ce of future
consumption equa l to 1. whereas the second budget constra int m
akes the pric e of present
consumption equa l to 1. The fi rst budget constra int thus measur es the p
eriod-l price relati ve to the
period- 2 price, whi le the second equation does the opposite (Varian 1993: 181
).
3.2.2 The Indifference Curve (Preferences for Consumption)
Indifference curves enable us to represent an individual' s prefe rences grap hically as long as eac h
bundle only contai ns two goods (G lahe and Lee 1989: I 10). An indifference curve is the locus of
points - particul ar combinations or bundles of goods - which yie ld the same utility (leve l of
sat isfact ion) to the consume r. so that he/she is indi ffercnt as to the particular combination he/she
consumes (Blair and Kenn y 1987 : 17; Kout soyianni s 1985: 18; Parkin 1990: 180; Pindyck and
Rubinfeld 1998 : 64). In other words, the individual has an equal preference for all bundl es of
goods that lie on the indi fference curve. and the shape of indi fference curves indicates the
consume r's tastes for consumption at di fferent times (G lahe and Lee 1989: 110; Lipsey et al 1987 :
146; Samuelson and Nordha us 1989: 462) .
If indiff erence curves Cl + ('2 were drawn fo r perfect substitutes, the consumer would be entirely
indiffe rent whether he/she consumed today or tom orrow (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998 : 64: Varian
1993: 182). The marginal rate of substitutio n between consuming today and tomorrow is thus
constan t at - 1 and the indi fference curve takes the shape of a straight line (Koutsoyiannis 1985: 20:
Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998 : 64) . In con trast if indifference curves C, + C2 were drawn for perfect
complements. thi s would indicate that the consumer wanted to consume equal amo unts of a good
today and tomorrow (Koutsoyiannis 1985: 20; Pind yck and Rubinfeld 1998: 64; Varian 1993:
183).
According to intertem poral eco nonuc theory, one can say that the intermediate case of we ll-
behaved preferences is the more reasona ble situation. The consumer is willing to substitute some
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amount of consumption today for consumption tomorrow, and how
much he/she is willing to
substitute depends on the particular pattcrn of con sumption that he/she h
as (Varian 1993: 183) .
After discussing the basic components of the inte rtcmporal choice mod
el. we relate this literature
to Ricardian equiva lence theory. As discussed abo ve. this theory is mo
delled on the principle that
whether government spending is finance d by taxes or bond s is inconsequ
ential , as government debt
does not represent net private wealth .
3.3 Infinite Lives and the Two-Period Model
Rob ert Barro (1974), wh o resurrect ed Ricardos the oretical argument. u
sed two distinct model s to
model Ricardian equivalence theory. In the first. individuals are assum
ed to have infinitely long
lives. The point of thi s is to ensure that the same individuals who buy b
onds will be taxed later to
pay them off. The key assumption here is that perpetual bond finance is
rul ed out and that debt has
to be pa id off at some point in time. Barros point. however, can be made i
n a much simpler model
where both the individual and the economy are assumed to exi st for j us
t two periods and that any
debt incurred in the first period must be paid off with interest in the seco
nd (Hoover 1988 : 140) . In
thi s model we can consid er each period as corresponding to roughl
y thirty years. The policy
interventi on may then entail a tax cut during a person' s youth coupled
wi th a tax inc rease during
his/her old age. Under thi s view, the relevant measure of unc ert aint y
is that of a yo ung person
regarding his/her incom e during the second hal f of his/her life (Barsky e
t al 1986 : 680).
The intert emporal choice probl em s for a representative ind ividual are
shown in Figure B. Here
each indi vidual is endowed with Y, unit s of a hom ogen ous con sumption goo d
in their youth and }'2
units in their old age. We thus assume that all consumers are identical. exce pt for the ir age. and
that the output is non-produced and non- storabl e (W iel 1987: 379) . In th is mo del eac h indiv idual is
subject to taxes of TI and 72 in each peri od . w hich are ass umed to be non-distortionary (lump-
sum) . Ca pita l markets are also ass umed to be perfect and agai n relaxing the fourth assumption.
income is saved at a fixe d rea l rate of interest to allow for appropriate intertem poral portfolio
adjustments (Yotsuzuka 1987 : 411. Ho over 1988 : 143) .
The initial di sposabl e income is shown at point u, The individua l can borrow or lend at a constant
rea l rate of interest r, and so can consume at an y point along the budget co nstraint a . The
co nsume r's optimum point is at point h where he/she plans to co nsume Cl in period 1 and ('2 in
period 2. Here the cons ume r maximises his/her utility constraint where the indiffer ence curve is
tangent to the budget co nstra int at h. This point of co nsump tion is represented (w ithout the
int roduct ion of taxes) in future va lue by:
(5 )
and present valu e by:
(6 )
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Figure B : Ricardian Equivalence and the Two-Period Model
c, ~-~ ~ -~ ~
=T,- T1+ 0
(Source: adaptedfrom Hoover 1988: 140)
Now let us assume an economy with taxes and the gove rnme nt decides
to cut them (the tax cut is
financed by the sale of government bonds). We then consider a decre
ase D in taxes and equal
increase in sale of bond s. Total government expenditure is therefor e n
ot affected (Hoover J988 :
141).





According to the Ke yne sians. the tax reduction is considered net we alt
h in period 1. However. if
government purchase s rem ain unchanged. taxes in period 2 must be rais
ed so that the second-




The implication here is that the present value o f income of the indi vid
ual rem ain s unchanged as
prior to the issue of debt and that the budget con straint (discussed
previously) also remain s
unchanged. Since the ratio of the changes of disposable income is:
- ( ) -+- r )D/D = - ( I -+- r ). ( 11 )
the new point o f disposabl e incom e in Figure B is c. which mu st lie on
the same budget con straint
as point a. The ind ividual' s optimum point of disposable income. however .
rem ain s at point h. In
conclusion. tax and bond finance are equiva lent as far as the econo
mic age nt's consumption
decisions are conce rned . In other words. the discoun ted value of the increased taxes in period :2 just
offsets the reduced taxes in period I. as follow s:
leaving the indi vidual' s opportunity set unaffected .
3.4 Overlapping Generations
Barros firs t model ass umes that peopl e live for an infinitely long time in order that no one might
use "a conve nient death " to avo id taxes (Hoover 1988: J4 1). However, the fac t that economic
age nts (people) do not live forever appea rs to undermine Ricardi an equiva lence. In other words:
"A tax cut today augments the wealth (?I" those alive today " (Hoover 1988 : 141). If bonds. which
are issued to repl ace tax revenues. are not repaid until far into the future, then the current
generation wi ll be deceased and thus not have to be taxed to pay them off; thu s their wealth will be
higher.
The modern analys is of the Rica rdian equivalence paradi gm. however, imagines famili es as
"dynastic " unit s. in the sense that each famil y is thought o f as a single, infinite-l ived agent that is
link ed through operative intergenerat ional transfers (Ba rro 1974: 1097: Bernheim 1989: 63:
Drazen 1987: 506; Graham and Himarios 1996: 527). Intergenerati onal transfers in the process of
wealth acc umulation, has been a recent subject of substantial empirical and theoretical analysis
(Kotlikoff 1988: 4 1). Ho we ver, the notion of intergenerational transfers was initially brought to
our atte ntio n through the works of David Ricard o, when referring to rati onal indiv iduals: "The
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great objective oftheir lives is to save afortune. both because it is their d
uty to make provision/or
their families . and because they cannot spend an income with so much co
mfort to themselves ... "
(David Ric ardo in Dobb and Sraffa 1966: 42 3).
An implication of thi s saving by individuals is that when death do es oc
c ur. the rational ind ividual
is genera lly holding som e wealth. which is then passed on to his/her hei
r s in the form of a bequest
(Abel 1985: 777 ). Bequests, whi ch are gifts from one genera tion to the
next , are either accidental
or are motivated by the parents' concern for thei r children ' s welfare
(Drazen 1987: 507 ; Parkin
.1 990: 484). According to theory. the we althier the fam ily. the more th
e famil y tend s to save and
bequeath to later genera tions. By making a bequest. "a family can spr
ead good and had luck
across the genera tions " (Parkin 1990: 484).
Following from the iss ue of bequ ests. Barro (1974). to dem onstrate
that taxes wo uld not be
escaped throu gh death. recast the argume nt into an "overlapping-ge
nerations model ''. first
introduced by Alla is ( 194 7) and Samuelson ( 1958) (Obstfe ld and
Ro goff 1996: 129). Here
successrve generations o f rational co nsumers are link ed through op
e rati ve intergenerational
transfe rs, so that consumption decision s can be modelled as being m
ade by a consume r with
'i nfi nite hor izon s ' (Yotsuzuka 1987: 411 ). Peopl e can therefore be d
escribed as livin g for two
periods, but overla pping one period with their children. In other words
, 'young ' economi c age nts
(co nsume rs) plan how mu ch to cons ume in eac h per iod of their lives an
d then how much to leave
their childre n as a bequest (endowme nt). Since it is assum ed that they
have rational expectations
(pe rfec t foresight in this co ntext). these plans turn out to co incide with
their (and their children' s)
actu al choi ces (Hoover 1987: 142). The same result holds in models in w
hich indi viduals live more
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than two period s. as lon g as some of the future taxes implied by debt are born e by futur e
generations (Seater 1993: 147).
In th is setti ng. hou sehold s capita lise the entire array of ex pec ted future taxes. and thereb y plan
effective ly with an infinite horizon. In othe r wo rds. the Ricardian result which seemed depend ent
on infinite horizons (as in the model above) , can remain valid with finite lifetimes (Barro 1989:
40). Th e criti cal ass umption in BaJTO ' s second model . how ever. is therefo re not the fact that a
hou sehold ' s gene rations overl ap, but it is rath er that the util ity of the ch ildren is of some concern to
the par ents. In this model we ass ume that each generation lives for onl y a sing le period , passing
away just as the next ge neration is born . We also ass ume that eac h genera tion, nevertheless. cares
for the we lfare of its children or as described by Seater (1993: 147 ): .....people regard children as
extensions ofthemselves. ..
The eco nomic age nt's util ity funct ion can be described as :
U = U(C I • U*), ( 13)
where Cl is the consumer' s own consumption and U* is the level of utility. which naturall y
depend s on the ch ildren ' s util ity. This utility function thu s impl ies that , although parents care
directly onl y about the ir own ch ildren ' s util ity and not that of any future ge neration. they must care
indi rectly abo ut every future ge neration. for anything that affects the co nsumption of their
grandchildren affects the util ity of their children and therefore affects their ow n utility (Hoover
1988:142: Seater 1993: 147).
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Barro ( ]974) thu s argues that once we include bequests in this way we return to a zero net wealth
effect. The argument is simply that iI' an indi vidual' s utility depends not only on his /her own
con sumption but also on either his/her children ' s consumption or utility (whose utility depends on
his children 's utility etc.), he/she will choose con sumption and bequests to maximise utility over an
infinite horizon. (Though it is important to note. of course, he/sh e cannot choose his/her children' s
consumption bundle dir ectly. ) Therefore, by including bequests based on a nested utility function.
Barro (1974) converts "infinitely long lives" into a 'more realistic' finite horizon problem (Hoov er
1988 : 14 I) , Drazen (1987 : 5(6), how ever. argues that the intergenerational transfer mechanism
must be "operative " in the sense that indi viduals plan to leave positi ve bequests to their children.
This chain-linked nature of the utility function mean s that without loss of generality we can refer to
the case in which the children are taxed in order to pay off debt issued in place of taxes to the
parents (Ho over 1988: 142). Fig ure B is reinterpreted in Figure C. so as to refer to two generations
instead of one.
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(Source: adaptedfrom Hoov er 1988: 1-10)
The parents' initial after-tax income is:
( 14)
The economic agents (i.e . the parents) then perfectly foresee (rationall
y expect), the children's
initial after-tax income to be:
y:~ - 72 ( 15)
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The budget co nstraint through point a represe nts the possible trade-offs between the parent s ' and
the children 's co nsumptio n. give n the real rate o f interest r. The indifference curves represent the
parents ' ut ility functio n and takes accou nt of the children's and future generatio ns ' utility functions
and budget co nstraints. Init iall y the parents choose to cons ume Cl and to leave a bequest of B to
their children . who m they co rre ctly expect to co nsume ('2 .
Just as in the ca se of the single generation with two-period lives (F igure B), substitution of debt for
taxes increases the after-tax income o f the parents but is exactly of/set by inc reased taxes on the
child ren. leaving the budget co nstraint and co ns umptio n plans unalt ered . The parents therefore
inc rease the ir beq uest from B to B' to offset the increased taxes on the ch ild ren . Therefore
Ricardian equivalence holds in the ' mo re real ist ic ' si tuation, whe re lives are finite and gene rations
ov erlap. It sho uld also be noted , as in Figure B, that if an indi vidual cha nges hi s/her endowme nt
from a to c. that does not change his/her optima l cho ice at h.
3.5 Conclusion
In th is chapter R icard ian equivalence is modelled within interternporal microecon omic theory. A
subst antia l part of the arg ume nt presented in thi s chapte r relates to inte rge ne rationa l econo mic
linkages and whe the r tran sfer moti ves give co ns umers effective ly infinite hori zon s. Bar ro (1974)
implied by his ce lebrate d model that provided agents loved their descenda nts and act ua lly left them
positive bequ ests, and that fin ite hor izons were no impedime nt to the operation of debt neutrality. a
theorem such as Ricardian equiva lence sho uld be a reality. However if the real rate of tim e
prefe rence is positi ve. one reason may be that the publ ic ca re much less about the future and the
problems of their desc endents than they do about the present and them selves .
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CHAPTER FOUR:
CRITQUE OF RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE
4.1 Introduction
It is clear from the discussion so far that Ricardian equivalence d
epends on a number of
assumptions about individual behaviour and /or the economic environm
ent (Bernheim 1989 : 63:
Darius 2001 : 50 ; Gupta 1992 : 19: Seater 1993 : 143: Yotsuzuka 1987: 411
).
Key Ricardian ass umptions are commonl y ident ified as:
1) Successive generations o f rational consumers linked by altrui stically
motivated transfers. so
that consumption decisions can be modelled as being made by a represe
ntati ve consumer with
infinite hor izons ;
2) Capital markets are either perfect or fail in specific ways;
3) Taxes are non-di stortionary (lump-sum) and there is full certainty abo
ut their future path: and
4) Equal planning horizons of the pri vate and public sector.
The literature of recent years has thus shown that complete Ricardi
an equivalence would be
expected to pre vail only under special conditions/assumptions (Fe ldst
e in and Elmendorf 1990 :
589). Virtuall y all well-articulated argument s against the Ricardian
doctrine are based on
theoretical and empirical criticisms of the assumptions. as violation
s of one or more of the
assumpti ons could lead to deviations from the equivalency propo
sition (Gupta 1992 : 19:
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Yotsuzuka 1987 : 411). Crit icisms thus generally relat e to problems asso
ciated with the relaxation
of the various assumptions made in the Ricardian models.
4.2 Rational Expectations
Firstly. rational expectations are hard to ju stify in this particular context.
The rational expectations
hypothesis advocates that people do not mak e systematic mistakes
, not becau se they have
knowledge of the true model of the economy but because the y adj ust t
heir behaviour to obvious
errors until they act as if they knew the true model. It is, however , not
likely that ordinary peopl e
implicitl y develop an ana lys is that has only recentl y accuratel y been f
ormulated by professional
economists, and it is not plausible to suppose that they acquire this skill
through a proc ess of trial
and error since the necessary experiment s generally extend beyond their
death s.
The rule for bequests (or for that matter saving between youth and old
age) that originates out of
the anal ysis of Ricardian equ ivalence. is simple: save all the gains from
tax cut s, and then never
treat governme nt bonds as net wea lth (Hoover 1988 : 144). Although th
is rule itself appears to be
simple. adeq uate justifi cati on for it requires a degree of economic soph
istication that tend s to be
beyond the commo nplace. According to Hoover (1988 : 144), it is too m
uch to assume that most
people perform a complicated economi c analysis in order to adjust their
bequests consistentl y. and
thu s it seems unlikely that they attempt to integrate future generation
s' utility with their ow n.
Barros argument may see m plausibl e because generally parents care
about the needs of their
children and wish to leave them bequests. However. while this ma y be
true. they probably do not
compare their children 's consumption or utility with their own: they rathe
r compare the actu al size
of the bequest to their 011'11 consumption.
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Poterba and Summers ( 1987: 144) suppo rt these arguments and suggest that consumers are myopic
(shor t-s ighte d) and may thu s fail to proje ct their incom e, fail to sys tematica lly incorpo rate future
(possibly unl egislated ) tax liabilit ies that can be inferred from the governme nt budget co nstra int, or
even fail to allocate resources tak ing full acco unt of co nsumption need s. It can be argued in th is
respect that co nsumers may rather emp loy ' rules of thumb ' , which in turn lead them to consume a
higher frac tion of their di sposabl e income than the models sugges t.
4.3 Liquidity Constraints
Many co ns ume rs may also face liquidity co nstra ints that prevent them from adj ust ing consumption
in response to di sposabl e inco me (Pote rba 1988 : 4 17; Seater 1993: 151 ). The constra int generally
moti vating thi s argume nt is credit ration ing arising from the household ' s inability to bor row
against its future incom e (Seater 1993: 151). In thi s case liqu idit y-con strained indi viduals may
spend part or all of a tax cut. since they wa nted a higher level of current con sumption but could not
borrow th is amount at a favourable interest rate becau se of imperfect loan mark ets
(M ukho padhyay 1994 : 46 1). Related to liquidity constraints IS the possibility of differ enti al
borr owing rates for households and the governme nt (Seater 1993 : 152) .
4.4 Borrowing Constraints
Borrowing co nstra ints may destroy debt neutrality whe n the majority of hou seholds benefit from
gains in utility if present taxes are reduced and future taxes are raised (Dari us 200 1: 52) . Eco nomic
age nts who face borrowing const ra ints are un able to borrow agains t uncert ain future incom e. and
"low productivity individuals " cannot borrow against the fu ture and thus have a marginal
4 1
propensity to consume of I , with respect to a current peri od cut in t
axe s (Hubbard and Judd in
Oarius 20 0 1: 52). Oarius (200 1: 52) argues that thi s problem arises
becau se of the differential
interest rates of the pri vate and public sec to rs. The private sector is ge
nera lly faced with a higher
int erest rate than the public sector, partially retlecting default po
tential , administration and
transaction costs. Co nsume rs facing higher interest rates view governm
ent bonds as net wealth and
thus discount future tax liabilities at a higher rate than the market ; henc
e the present value of future
taxes fall s sho rt of the tax reductions.
4.5 Distortionary Taxes
Anothe r key ass umptio n und erlying the deri vation of Ric ardian equiva l
ence is that taxes are lump-
sum and nondi stortionary (Le iderma n and Blejer 1988 :13). Ho wever.
in most practic al situa tions
taxes tend to be disto rtionary. These taxes may apply to person al incom
e, consumption . co rpo rate
income, foreign borrowing, and so forth. Cha nges in the timing of th
ese distortionary taxes can
affec t private se ctor and economy-wide a llocations .
Bud get deficit s in thi s case chan ge the timing of incom e taxes, a
nd thereby affe ct peopl e ' s
incentives to work and produce in different peri ods (Barro 1989:46
). Budget deficit s that are
associated with cha nges in the timing o f taxation co uld for instance p
roduce real reactions in the
economy via induced wea lth. red istributi on and intertemporal subst
itution effects . Changes in
labour income taxe s and corporate incom e taxes. for example.
will affect labour supply.
production . and co nsumption incenti ves th rou gh substitution, wea lth.
and distribution effects . In
addi tion to aggregate real effect s of distorti onary taxes, chan ges in the type of
taxation are likely to
have distribution effec ts that refl ect differenti al incidenc e across indi vid
uals in the economy . These
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di stri bution effects contribute to possible deviations fro m equivalence
that ar ise in the presence of
di stortion s (Le ide rman and Ble jer 1988: 14).
4.6 Uncertainty about Future Taxes and Income
In deriving the Ricardian- equivalence prop osit ion, it is assumed that
a current decrease in taxe s
indic ates a future rise in taxati on (Le iderman and Blej er 198 8:14). Th
e nature , amo unt and tim ing
of these future incr eases in taxes are assumed to be kno wn wi
th certainty by consumers.
Uncerta inty abo ut fut ure taxes alters the sa ving behaviour of indivi
du als. as co nsumers cannot
adequately pred ict the timing. nature and am ount of future taxation ,
as ass umed und er Ricardian
equivalence (Darius 200 1: 52; Mukhopadhyay 1994 : 460). Some
econ omists argue that thi s
uncertainty ab out ind ividuals ' future taxe s - or the complexity in estim
ating them - implies a high
rate of d iscount in capi ta lising these futur e liabiliti es (Barro 198 9 :45).
If the reason indi viduals hap pen to be uncert ain about wha t their fu
ture income is through the
indirect effect of changes in thei r tax rate. they wi ll a lso be uncertain o
f the amo unt of bequest they
will wa nt to make (Fe lds te in 1982:17: Seate r 1993:152). Unce rta inty a
bout the timing and path or
future taxati on thu s translates to a level of unc ert ainty regard ing th
e path of future disposabl e
income. Confronted w ith an uncertain income stream. the rati on al co n
s ume r will increase present
savings in an attempt to smooth consump tion over his/her lifetim
e. It is likely that rati on al
co nsumers may overestimate the average tax burden (especially in c
o untries with a high direct-
indirect tax ratio) (Dalamagas 1994 : 1204).
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Contrary to the standard hypothesis, declines in present taxation will incr
ease the level of domestic
savings. interest rates wil l decrease and investment will increase. Inc
identally. the opposite
scenano would occur when consumers are reasonably certain about fu
ture taxes and uncertain
about future mcome, which tends to be more likely in countries with
a high debt/income ratio
where consumers are better informed of the fiscal constraints und er whic
h the econ om y functions
(Da lamagas 1994 : 1204 : Darius 200 1: 52). It can therefo re be det ermined
from such an analysis
that devia tions fro m the neutral Rica rdian equiva lence positi on dep end
on the pred ictability of
income relative to taxes.
4.7 Fiscal and Debt Illu sion
Dariu s (20 01: 52) argues that in such a situation, although economic age
nts may intend leaving a
bequ est because of their inability to obligate the futur e labour inco
me of their descend ants.
consumers will use tax cuts to increase their ability to consum e a
t the expense of future
generations. In thi s respect it was Ricard o him self who noted that tax
payers might suffer from
what we now refer to as "fiscal illusion ". Rath er than taxation and debt iss
uance being equivalent
in their effects, Ricardo found them to be distinctly di fferent (O'Dris
co ll 1977 : 208). Ricardo
believed that in this case the ex istence of the debt issue wo uld deceive th
e wea lth holder-taxpayer
into believ ing that he/she was richer than he/she was. It appears that in m
any cases consumers may
also have little knowledge of the government's indebtedness and suffer
from what is comm onl y
referred to as "deb t illusion " (Allers et al 1998: 568).
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4.8 Information Costs
Using survey ev idence . Allers et al (1998: 568) indicates that the sav in
g behaviour of indi viduals
may not be infl uence d by fisca l policy. Dalamagas ( 1994: 1203) arg
ues that co nsumers do not
exactly perceive imp ortant fiscal va riables due to the imminent co
sts involved in obta ining
accura te info rmatio n on eac h indiv idua l's fiscal burden . and thus may b
e less Ricardian, as they do
not know their true tax burden. Three kind s of infor mation costs are usu
ally ment ioned :
I . Costs dependent on the degree of visibility of the taxes. (The less vi
sible a tax sys tem, the less
aware are people of thei r tax burden ).
2. Costs depend ent on the timing of the tax levy. (W hen taxes are pa
id at large intervals and in
excessive amo unts, the individual' s perception of the actua l tax burden
is increased , and vice
versa) .
3. Cos ts dependent on the degree of complexi ty of the tax structure. (
The more complicated the
tax sys tem. the more diffi cult it is for an ind ividual to develop an accura
te pictur e of his/her tax
burden ).
4.9 Finite Horizons and Related Issues
The idea of fini te horizons. moti vated by the fi niteness of life is ce
ntral to life-cycle models
menti oned previou sly. In these models individuals capita lise on taxe
s that they expect to face
before they die. If one con siders a defi cit financed tax cut, and assumes that the h
igher future taxes
occur partl y during the typic al pe rson' s expec ted lifet ime and partl y t
hereafter. then the present
va lue of the first portion must fall short o f the initi al tax cut , since the fu
ll balance results only wi th
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the inclusion of the second porti on (Barro 1989:40). The net wealth of perso ns currentl y alive rises
and households react by increasing consumption demand . Therefore desired pr ivate savi ng does
not increase to offset fully the decline in governme nt sav ing .
The argume nt above fail s if the typi cal person is already giving to his/her children out of altruism.
In this case peop le react to the government's imposed intergen erational transfers, wh ich are
implied by budget defi cits or soci al secur ity, with a compensating increase in vo luntary tran sfers.
The main idea is that a network of intergenera tional trans fers make s the typi cal person a part of an
extended family that goes on inde finite ly.
A critic ism of this however is with regard to the uncertainty surro unding the lifet ime of the ave rage
consume r, as one can die at any age. Eve n if the planning hori zon s of hou seholds are effective ly
infinite. the theory co llapses i r the probab ility of eac h dynas ty surv iving into the next period is not
equa l to unit y. With no bequest motive. uncert ainty could result in net wealth effects. It is argued
by Seater (1993: 148) that with such a degree of uncer taint y there is a strong probability that
consumers die before all taxes implied by current deb t are colle cted, passin g on to their children
their asset s with no altruism intended . Weil (1985) and Balanchard (198 5) in Darius (2001). in
turn , show that in the absence of operational bequ ests. an uncertain lifespan together with a
positive birth rate wo uld elimi nate debt neutrality.
Ye llen ( 1989: 20). in co nt rast. refers to the fact that the impact of interpersonal linkages may be
incomparably stro nger than what Barro (1974) asserts . The arg ument is that all indivi duals are in a
sing le interco nnec ted networ k and are ult imatel y biologically link ed . not only to their ow n ch ildren
and parent s but also to virtually all other person s who have ever lived or will live. through
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intermarriage across the generations. When an individual forgoes consumption in order to make a
bequest to a child. he/sh e in essence increases the aggregate wealth of all individuals other than
him/herself. This bequest will then in equilibrium be divided equally between all indi viduals and.
if the eco nomy is large. there will be a negligible effect on a child' s consumption (Bernheim 1989 :
65). Bernheim ( 1989: 65 ) shows that no government tran sfer or tax program should thus have any
real effect on people and that prices should therefore play no role whatsoever in resource allocation
over generations.
4.10 Childless Families
Another objection to Ricardian equivalence however is that some persons. such as tho se without
children. are not connected to future gen erations. Even if familie s with children behave
altruistically there are families with no children (Seater] 993 :151). Persons in thi s situation tend to
be made wealthier when the government substitutes a budget deficit for taxes (Barro ]989:41 ).
Having little or no concern for taxes levied on future generations, they will tend to alter their
economic deci sions when the government swaps debt for taxes. As a result Ricardian equivalence
will not hold.
4.11 Different Planning Horizons for Private and Public Sectors
For economic agents to beh ave in a mann er that is consistent with the Ricardian hypothesis. the
planning hori zons and the discount factor of the private and public sector should be similar (Darius
200 I: 52). A departure from this condition may arise due to an individual' s uncertainty about
his/her lifetime. The main result from anal ysing th is departure is that , in the presence of such
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uncerta inty, and assuming no bequest motive, a tax cut wi ll lead to a ris
e in perceived wealth and
consumption of currently alive ind ividuals (Leid erman and Blejer 198
8:17). That is, the tax cut
enables a shifting of future tax liabilities to later generations.
4.12 An Alternative Perspective
One could deduce tha t Barro (1974 ) may have set up the Ricard
ian equ ivalence probl em
incorrectl y. The who le motivation behind Rica rdian equiva lence is based
on the belief that parent s
are concerned about their children's utility. However. an alterna tive s
ituation may exist where
parents may be liquidity-constrained, and may thus pre fer to consume th
e extra income left after a
reduction in taxes. Th is situa tion where the bequ est moti ve by parent s to
wa rd their children is non-
operational is descr ibed below in relati on to Figure D. It must firstl y be noted
that the vertical ax is
in Figure 0 measures the parents' beq uest and not the children's secon
d period consumption and
incom e as in Figures 13 and C. If the parents have an after-tax income of:
( l (, )
they may either consume it all or trade off consumption for bequests at a ra
te determined by the
real rate of interes t. The co nsumer thus chooses point a, with a bequ est B and c
onsumption Cl.
Now we consider a substi tution of deb t for taxes that increases the consu
me r's afte r tax income to:
( 17)
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Figure D: Ricardian Equivalencefails when Parents ' Bequ est Motives are a
bsolute
Y1 - T; C1
=Y1 - T1+ 0






(Source: adaptedfrom Hoover 1988 : 1--15)
Since they do not account for the ir children's income or consumption
choices, in this case, the
budget constraint is shifted out to the right. The new equilibrium is at b
. As shown, both current
consumption for parents and the level of bequests rise. Now, since the opp
ortunity set has changed,
the parents' real choic es will change, and any chang es in the leve
l of bequests will only




When analysing the behavioural characteri stic s of Ricardian equiva le
nce it becomes clear that
Ricardian equiva lence is governed by a number of strict assumptions .
It was an identification of
the assumptions that led to a final discussion on the strong criticism
centred round Ricardian
equival enc e. These criti cisms suggest that the evaluation of Ricardian e
quivalence may ultimately
be an empirical matter. Thi s question is inve stigated in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS - AN ECONOMETRIC APPROACH
5.1 Introduction
"i t is typically the case in economics that theory is needed to unearth t
he interesting questions.
'while empirical research is needed to answer them " (Blinder 1976: 87).
It can ther efore be argued that the ultimate test of the theory is not neces
saril y in the plausibility of
its assumptions, but whether or not it leads to predictions that are con
firmed by the data (Chan
1983 : 371: Rosen 1992 : 454 ). From a review of the literature it can b
e seen that under certain
assumptions the effect of a given rate of government expenditure
on aggregate demand is
independent of whether thes e expenditures are financed by taxes or
by debt issue. Hence the
proposition of 'equivalenc e'. Given the serious policy implicati ons o
f this proposition, a large
body of empirical work on modelling and test ing of Ricardian equivale
nc e has accumulated over
recent years (Dalamagas 1992 : 59).
The aim of thi s chapter is to consider empirical research that concern s
the testing for Ricardian
equivalence over the past three dec ade s and to test for Ricardian equiva
lence using South African
data to determine whether consumer evidence from South Africa. a cou
ntry with a high degree of




The branch of eco no mics that deals with the quantitative ana lysis of people ' s behaviour usin g
eco nom ic data is eco no metrics (At kinso n 1982: 15: Begg et al 1987 : 34). Since Ricardian
equiva lence. as alrea dy discussed . co nce rns the behavioural decision s of eco nomic age nts
(individual con sumers), the empirica l anal ysis of Ric ardi an equi valence, in this study. will utilise
an econome tric app roach.
Literally interp reted , eco nome trics means "economic measurement " (Gujarati 1988: 1: 1999 : 1).
Econometric ana lys is is utili sed because for most economic deci sions or choic e problems it is not
enough to know that certain economi c va riab les are interr elated. or even the direction of the
relat ionshi p (Griffi ths et al 200 1: 3). In addition it is imp ortant to und erstand magnitudes involved .
That is. it mu st be possible to say how much a change in one var iable affects another.
5.3 The Standard Econometric Model
Eco nomic mod els are a simplifica tion of realit y that offer predi ctions of future eco nomic activ ity
(Dernb urg and Mc Douga ll 1980: 15: Mi ller 1982: 35 1). More specifica lly. an econome tric model
is a set of fun ction s and identities. which have been fitt ed to historical da ta . Each function or
equation represents the quantitative relat ionship(s) between the relevant eco no mic variables ,
expressed in mathematical terms (Botha et al 1995: 27). Therefore one can describe an
econome tric model as a quantitative vers ion of a parti cul ar eco nomic model.
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5.4 Previous Empirical Work
Empirical literature over the last decade has devoted considerable attent
ion to the effects of fiscal
policy on privat e consumption or sav ing (Lopez et al 2000) . The Ricardia
n equ ivalence proposition
has generated a large number of empirical studies most on the United
States , some on industrial
countries. and a related cottage industry that surveys them (Lopez et al 2
00 0: 4). Among the latter
surveys , Bernheim (1987), Leiderman and Blej er (1998), and Elmen
dorf and Mankiw (1998)
indicated that the empirical evidence reje cts Ricardian equivalence.
Leiderman and Blejer (1998) considered the impact of governme nt polic
ies on the current level of
consumption under a variety of fiscal signals and reviewed some of th
e evidence on the type of
signals that could have been observed in practice. It was argued tha
t although the Ricardian
equi valence propositi on is valid there are likel y to be deviati ons fr
om it in practice. These
deviations are not nece ssaril y as a result of irrati onality or lack of full
discounting of future tax
liabilities by the public . Agents may be full y rational : yet owin g to t
he presence of borrowing
constraints and distortionary taxes, which represent deviations from Ri
cardian assumptions. their
optimal behaviour will result in non-equi valence of taxes and debt insof
ar as aggregate demand is
concern ed . Leiderman and Blejer (1998 ) concluded that the fact th
at deviations exist from
Ricardi an equivalence. implies that deficit finance policies can ha
ve an impact on pri vate
consumpt ion and agg regate dem and that would be nonexi stent oth erwise
.
However a small but prominent minority of economists, including Robe
rt Barro, have argued that
Ric ardian equivalence doe s in fact describe the world, at least as a first
approx imation (Elmendorf
and Manki w 1998 : 43) . which is a view refle cted in Seater ' s ( 1993) sur
vey. Seater (1993 ) argues
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that the oreticall y we can be almost ce rta in that Ric ardian equi valenc e
is not literally true, as it
requi res a considerab le number of stringe nt conditions. Sea ter ( 1993) h
owever argues furth er that
equiva lence does appear to be a goo d approx ima tion and that although s
ome of the early empirica l
literature sent conflicting signa ls, recent work tend s to support Ricardi an
equivalence. Most of th is
empirica l work has concentrated on the United States and very littl e on
the developing countries,
which is surprising given the fact that these countries have also been
ex periencing considerable
budget deficits (Gupta 1992 : 19) .
Empirica l studies of the Ricardi an equiva lence hypothesis have taken m
any form s, however most
are from either one of two types. The first type is based on general re
duced-form equations for
private consumption or sav ing. The seco nd gro up of studies are
based on the empirical
impl ement ation of private consumption functions derived from first
principl es (and therefore
including a limited set o f regressors) that are used to test for spec ific
departures from Ricardian
equivalence. A measure of government debt or the deficit is often inclu
ded as a regres sor in these
studies (Wheeler 1999). The empirical studies developed in (his thesi s ar
e based on the latter of the
two gro ups . Estimations used in Ricardian studies (as in the studies in
this thesis) are typi call y
based on time -se ries macroeconomic data for one or several industria l
and developing countries
(Lopez 2000).
The Ricardi an studies und ertaken in this thesis are based on a linear
consumption function. Of
previous consump tion function studies Kochin ( 1974), Tanner ( 1979).
Kormend i (19 83 ). Sea ter
and Mari ano ( 198 5) and Aschauer ( 1985 ) find empirical support for Ric
ard ian equiva lence. while
Yawitz and Meyer ( 1976 ) and Feldstein ( 1982) do not. Kochin (1974)
tested the hypothesis that
consumers anticipate the future taxes implied by present deficit
s and that consumption
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expenditures. given disposable income. vary in such a way as to offset
the effect of government
deficits. Since Keynes placed the consumption function at the centre
of his theory of national
income determination. there has been considerable effort expended
upon finding empirical
counterparts to the theoretical concept s .,income " and ..consumption. .. T
he goals of these efforts
have been to test the Keynesian theory. which predicts that a dependable
relationship will be found
between consumption and income. and to use this relationship to pred
ict changes. The equation
used to estimate the following function was:
C> a + b)',
where C is consumption and Y is income.
( IS)
In order to estimate the parameters of this equation. empirical count
erparts were selected for
consumption and income. Initial studies identified "income " with
what was later termed
"measured income. " which referred to the actual income accruing to all in
dividuals. Consumption
was identified with consumption expenditures. described as the total e
xpenditures of individuals
except for purchases of financial assets. business property. and resid
ential real estate. Kochin
(1974) indicated that debt is financed by a rise in the future rate of
exci se taxation on bank
balances and that the burden of this tax may fall on the owners of spe
cialised resources used by
banks as well as on the owners of bank balances. The savings to income
ratio for 1961-71 revealed
that the movements of the deficit are highly correlated with movem
ents in the saving ratio
sug gesting consumers may discount implicit tax liabilities involved in d
eficit finance . However if
debt is funded by households then this is an identity; causality has nothin
g to do with it.
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In order to answer the question of whether deficits reduce the level of con
sumption, Kochin (1974 )
estimated the effect of including the federal government deficit in sever
al consumption functions
using Am erican data . The de ficit s consistently had the theoreticall y pre
dicted effect of lower ing
the level of consumption. The basic theoreti cal formulation used.
the perm anent mcorne
hypothesis, suggested that consumption is a constant proport ion of pe
rmanent income. Kochin
(1974 ) concluded that consum ers seem. on the basis of the evidence, to
have taken some account
of the future taxes imp lied by the deficit spending. People in the United
States appeared to spend
less and save more. all other thin gs being equal. whene ver the Fede ral G
ove rnment was in deficit.
The Governme nt tends to run defi cits when things are 'bad' and spirits are
low.
In ord er to det ermine if consumers view gov ernment debt as net we
alth, Yawitz and Meyer
estimate the following equa tion using agg regate data from the United St
ates for the period 1953 -
69 (Ta nner 1979):
( 19)
Where t :' is real consumption expenditures, YD is real disposable inco me, W
is household real net
worth excl usive of the private sector's holdings of government debt. GDE
B is the real market
.value of the private sec tor's holdings of government debt. and It , is a
random error term. The
argument is that. under the ass umption that future expected income is
identical with the current
level. the above equation is an appro priate version of the life-cycl
e model for testin g the
proposition about government debt being net wea lth. In the life-cyc
le approach. consumers'
expenditures depend on the total amo unt of resources ava ilable ove r the
ir lifetim e. Later versio ns
of this approach acco unt for these resources by not only incorporat ing c
urrent disposable income
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and the stoc k of wealth at the beginning of the period but also by adjusting disposable income by
the current unemployment rate to more closely approxima te future disposable incom e by takin g
into account other forms of accrued inco me such as corporate sav ings and by including the stoc k of
durables.
Tanner 's (1979) tim e series evide nce from tests using United States data for the 1947-74 period
indicated that government debt is not perceived by consumers as bein g net wealth and that rather,
the aggrega te United States data supports the view that consumers take acco unt of all the future tax
liab ilities implicit in the government deficit s and in the stoc k of acc umulated government debt.
There fore Tann er ' s esti ma tes using a respecified life-cycle co nsumption function find that
governme nt debt is not net wea lth.
Sea ter and Ma riano (1985) test a version of the perm anent incom e consumption functio n suggested
by Barro (1983) . Barro postul ated the following consumption function:
c = C ( Q P+ , GP. , G .. r . .. . .). (20)
Where C is real consumption, QI' is perm anent real gross income , GP is permanent real government
expenditure on goods and services, r is the after-tax real rate, o f interest, and the sign to the right of
a var iable is the sign of co nsumption function ' s derivative with respect to that variable. According
to the permanent income hypoth esis. consumption depends on perma nent dis posable income.
Sea ter and Mariano (1985) expande d the specification of the permanent incom e consumption
function proposed by Barro ( 1983) . The consumption func tion fitted the data for the period 1929 -
1975 we ll and suggested that several variables previously ignored in the literature have import ant
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effects on cons umption ex penditure. Barro s spec ifica tion yie lded results that we re very consistent
with com plete tax discount ing and Seater and Ma riano (198 5) indicated more tradi tional
specifications that also yie lded results co ns iste nt with tax disco unting .
Aschauer ( 198 5) advanced in his paper that pro bable misspecifi cation bias in previous Ricardian
studies renders the results suspect and may account for the fact that min or change s in empirica l
models lead to radically di fferent conclus ions regarding the effecti veness of fiscal policy. The
theory in Aschauers paper appl ies to a representative individua l who has tim e-separable
prefe rences over private co nsump tion and the goo ds and services flowing fro m the governme nt
sector. The representative indi vidual is ass umed to be "forward looking " in regard to the fiscal
affairs of the governme nt. In a study of intertemporal cons umption be haviour Aschauer ( 1985)
indicated tha t in order to obtain an ade quate measure of consumpt ion, one needed to add to the
curre nt co nsumer expendi ture a n ow of services fro m previou sly acquired cons umer durabl es. and
to subtract the curren t ex pendi tures on durabl e goo ds. Whe n co nsumption is described in thi s
manner cons umer consumption is defin ed . The emp irical ana lys is thus involved per capita
co nsume r ex penditure on nondurables and services measured in constant ( 1972) dollars and
quarterly data was used throughout the study . The empi rical results of the study sugges ted that the
view of the effects of fis ca l pol icy actio n on the eco nomy is de finite ly credi ble.
Yawitz and Meyer (1976) ind icate that their approach differs fro m Tanne r and Kochins that
supports Ricardian eq uivalence (disc ussed above), in that they obtain an estimate of tax
disco unt ing by emp loying a properly speci fied agg regate consumption func tion and generate a
tim e series for the mar ket value of the deb t which takes proper account of capi ta l ga ins and losses
from interest rate changes. The model origi na lly develop ed posits the indi vidual to maxim ise
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his/her intertemporal consumption function subject to the resources a
t his/her disposal. These
resources are the sum of current income, discounted future income, and
current (other) net worth.
The basic formulation of the life-cycle hypothesis, under the assump
tion that future expected
income is identical with the current level, is given by:
c = C(Y, A). (21)
where C denotes consumption expenditure and Y and A are the appropriate
income and wealth
variables, respectively. Both C and C,are hypothesised to be positive and less than one. S
ince the
attempt was to measure tax discounting within an aggregate consump
tion function, the specific
structural equation estimated contained three independent variables: i
ncome, wealth minus the
market value of the debt. and the market value series:
(22)
C = total consumption expenditures
Y = disposable income
Bg = market value of private sector holdings of government securities
A 'hh = household net worth minus Bg.
The paper thus developed a methodology which allowed for the measu
rement of the contribution
of the debt to perceived private sector wealth . No evidence was found of
even a partial discounting
of the future tax liability accompanying debt creation.
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Feld stein ( 1982) argues in his paper that changes in government spen
ding, transfers and taxe s
could have considerable effects on aggregate demand . He indic ate s that
the change in expectations
and spending that results from any given fiscal action will differ from on
e time to another in a way
that dep ends on the whole histor y of previous fiscal ac tions and on the
rece nt and past legi slat ive
debates . He further argues that it is impossible to predi ct with accuracy
how consumers ' spending
will respond to fiscal change in a particular year. This uncerta inty and
variability in response is
therefore found to have important implications for macroeconomic polic
y and for the economet ric
testing of the traditional debt view. Feld ste in (1982) suggests that
the variable response of
consumption to fisc al signals impli es that econ om etric ana lys is cannot e
stimate "the' consumption
function. but rather the average effects on consumer spending of change
s in government spending.
in taxes and in transfers. The effectiveness of fiscal policy is seen in
this paper as depend ing
crucially on the way in which the consum er links a current fiscal change
to his future tax liabilities
and how these anticipated liabiliti es affe ct his/her current behaviour. T
he evidence presented in
Feldsteins paper indicates that changes in governme nt spending or t
axes can have substantia l
effects on aggregate dem and .
A number of studies test for Ricardian equivalence using sing le-equat
ion redu ced-form models.
The majorit y of these studies seem to test Ricardian equivalence by
estimating reduced-form
equat ions where the interest rate is the dependent variable. and the
deficit or a measure of
government deb t is incl uded among the list of regressor s. Exceptions to
these studies however are.
for examp le. Eisner and Pieper ( 1984) who reject Ricardian equiva lence
on the basis ofregressions
of real Gross Na tional Produ ct (GN P). or the unemployment rate. or o
n various measures of the
deficit. Eisner and Pieper ( 1984) note tha t offic ial measures of federal de
bt in the United States are
misleading for reasons such as gross public debt figures ignoring finan
ci al asse t accumulation as
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well as the real asset s which contribute to a growing net worth. Budget
flow s have also failed to
distinguish between current and capital accounts , and measures of surp
lus and deficit have been
inconsistent with changes in the real value of net debt.
De Leeuwand Holl oway (1985) argue that a recurring criticism of pote
ntial GNP has been that it
is an exceptionally difficult concept to define and measure and that an al
ternative would be to base
a reference trend on movements of actual GN P afte r filtering out cyclica
l fluctuati ons. The reason
for the choice of a trend based on movements of actual GNP is that it
leads to a more effective
measure of cyclicall y adjusted debt. De Leeuw and Holloway (1985 ) reg
ressed nominal GNP on a
vector of explanatory variables. including the changes in governm
ent debt and the level
of gov ernment debt. and conclude that their data does not support Ricard
ian equivalence (Wheeler
1999).
The remaining single-equation studies use an interest rate as the depend
ent variable and generally
these studies support the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis (Wheeler 1
999). Makin (1983) is an
exception to thi s and unlike other studies. he uses a transfer functio
n model. The study that
focu ssed on short-term intere st rate s where behaviour in the Unit ed St
ates has been particularly
unusual rejected Ricardian equivalence . McMillin ( 1986) however fin
ds empirical support for
Ricardian equi valence based on Granger-causa lity tests using the short-te
rm interest rate.
Evans ( 1985) finds that there is no link between the deficit and short- an
d long-term rates . Several
researchers have attempted to find an association between nominal int
ere st rates and the United
States deficit using post-war dat a. Although a few have found a w
eak positive. statistically
significant association, many others have found none . Therefore in
this case the economic
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paradigm that impli es that large deficit s produce high interest rates is not
supported by the facts. In
over a century of United States history. large deficit s have never been ass
oci ated with high interest
rates and even the post-war periods separa tely offe r no support for a pos
itive association between
deficits and inte rest rates. The explanation most consistent with these ob
servations is Barros who
argues that it may be optimal for households to react to an increased d
eficit by increasing their
sav ing by an equal amount. An increase in the deficit will therefore e
ntail an equal increase in
sav ing. which will be suffi cient to pay extra future taxes levi ed on cu
rrent households and the
futur e gener ations. Evans (199 5) argues further that concern should not
focus on what deficits do
to interest rates. capita l acc umulation. or economic growth . for there is lit
tl e evidence that indicates
that deficits affect these variables. Evans (1987) therefore supports Ric
ardian equivalence as he
find s that both the actua l and the antic ipated deficit have no impac t on
both short- and long-term
interest rates.
Hoelscher 's (19 83) results support Ricardian equ ivalence using a sho
rt-term interest rate. but
rejects Ricardian equivalence using a long-term interest rate. Th e regressio
n tests in this paper
employ quarterl y United States data for the period 1952 to 1976 . The r
egression results indicate
that there is no significant correlation between Federal borrowin gs. whe
ther measured in absolut e
terms or as a percentage of GNP. and high shor t-term interes t rates
. A Chow test that was
performed indicates that result s of the regression model were stab le. Go
vernme nt borrowin g was
tested for correlat ion with an interest rate ser ies. and no corre lation was
discovered . The empirical
result s supported Ricardian equivalence to the extent that private expendi
tures are sensitive only to
short interest rates and Federal borrowin g does not have financial crowdin
g effec ts.
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Hoelscher 's ( 198 6) wo rk shows a positi ve relati onship between a long-t erm interes t rate, the 10-
year Treasury ra te. and se vera l di fferen t measures of defi ci t spendi ng. These results contradict
those fo und with a sho rt-term interest rate. the three month Treasury rate. in Hoelsch ers 1983
results dis cussed above. Th e paper examines Hoels cher ' s two di vergent results between defi cit s
and interest rates. The answer to finding the source of the differen ce in defi cit effects on the sho rt
term versus lon g-t erm ra tes is determined by the equiva lence theorem of Bar ro. Bar ros model
states that antic ipated defic its would not increase interest rate s, given any pa rticular level of
government spe ndi ng . This holds for lon g and sho rt-term rates . Hoelscher 's results thus suppo rt the
equiva lence theorem and it is arg ued that the Ricardian equivalence theorem sho uld be tested by
examining the effects of the antic ipate d deficit on lon g-and-short term interest rates.
Swarn y et al. (1990) es timated seve ral versions of the relatio nship between interest rates and
deficits wi th fix ed slopes. usmg different estimation techniqu es. A random walk model is a
relative ly good forecast ing model for the (3-month) Treasury bill rate . Swamy et al. ( 1990)
concludes that both the magn itude and sign of the coefficie nt on federal de fici ts divided by
nominal GNP in th e 3-month Treas ury bill equations mi ght change from one period to the next.
From thi s result the conventional parad igm ca nno t be rejected beca use in the presence of
measurement errors the positive sig ns for the coeffic ient on tru e deficit s are cons istent wi th the
negati ve sign fo r the coeffi cient on me asured deficits in the 3-mo nth Treasury bill equations . A
negati ve relat ionsh ip between the de ficit and measure of the sho rt- te rm interes t rate is thu s found.
Autho rs such as Barro (1974). Fac kler and McMi llin (1989), Kormendi (19 83). and Evans (198 7)
int erpret this result as a rejection of Ricardi an equivalence. However. other authors have
interp reted a neg at ive re lations hip between various econo mic aggrega tes and defi cit or de bt
measures as support for Ricard ian eq uiva lence.
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A few previous studies considere d testing for Ricard ian equiva lence using Vec tor Autoregression
(VAR) models. These models involve a truly simultaneo us system in that all var iables are regarded
as endogenous. In VAR modelling the value of the variabl e is expressed as a linear function of the
past or lagged values of the variable. and all other variables includ ed in the model (Gujarati 1995).
If eac h equatio n contains the same number of lagged variables in the sys tem, it can be estimated by
ord inary least squares (OLS) without resorting to any system s method, such as two-staged least
squares (2SLS) or seemingly unrelated regressions (SU RE) .
The VAR studies generally support Ricardian equivalence. Plosser (1982 ), Fackler and McMillin
(198 9). and Darrat (1989. 1990) in their papers, all confirm the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis
using pos t-war data. Plosser ' s (1982) paper concerns an empirical inves tigation between
government financing decision s and asset returns . In part icular. the focus is on whether a
substitution of debt financi ng for tax financing of a given level of expe nditures is assoc iated with
an increase in interest rates . The init ial model is deve loped using the assumption of capi tal market
effic iency or rational expectations. The assumption of market effi ciency refers to when capital
markets respond to movements in vario us economic variab les . The paper brings a different
perspective to empir ical inves tigat ions of gove rnment fiscal policies by exa mining the response of
asse t prices in an efficient cap ital market to such policies rather than focusing on aggregat e
consumption behaviour. The empirica l analyses in this paper provide little evidence that
gove rnment bonds represe nt net wea lth to the private sector. The result s are rather consistent with
the idea that asset prices are unrelated to how the gove rnment finances its expenditures .
64
The objective of Fackler and McMillin 's (1989) study is to analyse empirically the effects of
federal government debt on the macro economy for the period 1963-1984. An important distinction
between this and most of the earl ier analyses is that the effects of the debt on key variables (output.
prices and a long-term interest rate ) are anal ysed within the conte xt of a small empirical macro
model. A second distinction is the separation of the market values of privately held federal debt
into two components: domesti cally held debt and forei gn held debt. This distinction is important
both conceptually and economically. The results are determined by using vector autoregressions
(VARs) and in light of the evidence that the results of some types of anal yses are sensitive to the
particular type of VAR that is estimated, the robustness of the results was checked by employing
different variants of the VA R methodology.
The effects of debt were evaluated by computing impulse response functions, vanance
decompositions, and hist orical decompositions. The result s indicated that the sum of domestically
held and foreign-held debt had non-tri vial effects on the long-term interest rate and output and the
effects on prices were much weaker. Fackl er and McMillin (1989) suggest that their result s are
Ricardian as, due to unc ertainty about the individual's share of future tax es and timing of these
taxe s, indi viduals may save more than the present value of the income streams associated with
bonds issued to finance a gov ernment deficit. Wealth is thu s reduced, implying the expected
negative effects on interest rates. output. and prices.
Darrats (1989) paper on "Fiscal Deficits and Long- Term Interest Rates " focused on the causal
relati onship between budget deficits and long-term intere st rates in the United States in the cont ext
of annual data covering the period 1946 through to 1986. As in Hoelscher (1986), long-term
(rather than short-term) interest rate s are the focu s of the paper because of the importance of long-
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term interest rates m transmitting the real effects of budget deficits. The paper re-exammes
empirically the conventional proposition that budget deficits cause changes in interest rates. Initial
studies in the area have typic ally tested this proposition in the context of correlation-based
analysis: however, such ana lysis is incapable of discriminating between four alternative but
equally plausible hypotheses, each with different policy impli cations. These are that deficits cause
interest rates (the conventional view), that interest rates cause deficits, that there is bidirectional
causality between the two variables, and finall y that both variables (although possibly correl ated)
are causally indep endent.
The paper employs a multi variate Granger-causa lity approach to test the validity of the above
hypotheses. The Granger-causality test assumes that the information relevant to the prediction of
the respect ive variables used is contained solely in the time series data on these variables and
forms the seeds of the VAR model (Gujarati 1988, 1995). The empirica l results reject the
conventional prop osition that budget deficits have caused significant changes in long-term interest
rates. Instead support was found for the reverse (reaction-function type) hypothesis that long-term
interest rates have caused significant changes in the defic it measures. The result s of this paper are
thus in support of the Ricardian pos ition and thus cast further doubts on the presence of significant
crowding-out effec ts for budget deficits. The paper "Structural Federal Deficits and Interest
Rates " of Darrat (1990) foun d evidence that structura l defi cits are not eo-integrated with the
corporate bond rate, implying the lack of any long-run equilibrium relationship between the two
variables. If valid, these result s cast further doubt on the presence of signifi cant crowding-out
effec ts for budget deficits.
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The brief explanation of empirical studies above. indicates the irregular empirical support for
Ricardian equi valence. Wheeler (1999) argues that if one compares the consumption function
studies it is noted that seemingly trivial changes in specification can dramatically alter the
empirical result s. Based on the other empirical work discus sed in this sections one can argue a
stronger line than that of Wheeler. It seems to be the case. based on the many studies we review
here. that suppo rt for Ricardian equi valence is mixed and sensitive to the data , type of test and
other specifications. This provides one with a testabl e 'viewpoint' namely: How sensitive is a test
for Ricardi an equi valence (us ing South African data ) to changes in the data. test and other
specifications? Thus this thesis conducts empirical work but uses more than one test and time
period. not only to replicate the work of others. but also to determine how sens itive the South
African result s are to changing specifications.
Research conducted a decade ago, that considered South Afri can data, was developed in
Damalaga's 1994 pap er entitled "The tax versus debt controversy in a multivariate eointegrated
syste m ". In his paper Dalamagas (1994) considers a sample of countries that he classifie s
according to their degree of indebtedness. measured by the ratio of government debt to GDr
(debt/income ratio) of which South Africa was one. Dalamagas (1994) questions the extent to
which relati ve empirical estimates do not adequately distin gui sh among countries with varying
levels of indebtedness. The paper approaches the problem by using Joh ansori ' s cointegration
technique and by sorting the sample countries into groups. acco rding to the ratio of debt to GDP.
Dalam agas' ( 1994: 1198 ) result s indic ate that the Ricardian equiva lence position relates to
countries with a high debt/inc ome ratio. for example the South African national deficit as a
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percent age of GDP was 7.5% in 1997/1998 (South Afr ican Reserve Bank 2002 : 53) '*. According
to the results, the alterna tive or tradi tional view appears to be more prevalent in countr ies with a
low level of indebtedness. The significa ntly negat ive coefficient on the defi cit using South African
data ind icat es the failure of the traditi onal views but is insuffi cient to validate the alternative
equivalence proposition indicating rather near Ricardian result s for South Africa . This thesis
considers the research by Dalamagas ( 1994) as a platform for test ing for the ex istence of Ricardian
equivalenc e in the South African situ ation using different empirica l techni que s. Initially, the basic
framework of the emp irical analys is utili sed is briefly discussed below.
5.5 The Framework of Analysis
The most popul ar method utilised in determining the relevance of Ricardian equiva lence has been
to regress private consumption on government budget along with other theo retic ally dete rmined
variables (Darius 200 1:53) . Co nsumption functions such as the one used in this study of Ricardian
equiva lence are commonly depic ted as linear fun ctions. Mos t econom ic probl ems involve two or
more explanatory varia bles that int1uence the depend ent var iable Y. For example. in the
consumption function used to identi fy the exis tence of Ricardian or the more tradit ional consum er
behaviour. household consumption relates to variables such as household income. gove rnment
expenditure and the government's bud get deficit. When we turn an economic model with more
than one explanatory var iable into its corresp onding eco nometric model , we refer to it as a multi ple
regression model (G riffiths et al 200 1: 145).
I • Bur I. 15 % in 2003
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We may express a multiple regression model as :
where Y, is the dependent var iable, Xl and X] are the exp lanatory var iables (or regressors). u the
stochas tic disturbance or error term. and 1 is the Ith observation. In equation (18) fJ/ is the intercept
term that gives the mean or average effect on Y of all the variables excluded from the model.
although its mechanical interpretation is the average value of Y when Xl and X] are set equal to zero
(Gujarati 1995: 192). The fJl and fJ] are ca lled the partial regression coefficie nts. The meaning of
partial regression coeffic ient is as follows: fJl measures the change in the mean value of Y per unit
change in )(1 holding X] con stant.
The disturbance, or error term . is a random (stochastic) variable that captures any approx imation
error that arises, because the linear functional form we have assumed may be only an
approximation to reality (Griffiths et a12001: 145).
As far as regression analysi s is concerned, the meth od that is used most extensively, and that is
used in this study, is the method of ord inary least squares (OLS) . This analysis is based on the least
squares principl e. which asse rts that to tit a line to the data values we should fit the line so that the
sum of the squares of the vertica l distance s from each point to the line is as small as possible
(Griffiths et al 2001: 51).
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5.6 Empirical Testin g for Ricardian Equival ence
Emp irical ana lysis in this thesis atte mpts to consider the ass umptions concerning Ricardian
equivalence and its relevance to South Africa through empirical evidence . The single equation.
multiple regression model s used in this study utilise time series data. which impli es data coll ected
over discrete intervals of time. The models are base d on the model used by Basil Dalamagas in his
paper "The Tax versus Debt Controversy in a Multivariate Cointegrating System" (1994) . The
results of the Dalamagas study are based on quarterly data (83 obse rvations) starting in 1971 and
ending in 1992 . It was decided to test both quarterly and annual data sets . The data used in the
research is national statistical macroeconomic data of South Africa, obtained from Supplement 10
the Sout h African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin Jun e 1999 (See Appen dix) .
5.6.1 The Dalamagas Model
Dalam agas (1994 : 1205) set up a model to establish whether the cho ice bet ween financing
government expenditure from taxes or from government bond s affected con sumption that related
to the ratio of public debt to GDP (disc ussed above) . Dalamagas (1994) was thus inten t on
determ ining the relationsh ip betwee n private consumption expenditure and defic it financing
through the sale of government bonds, as opposed to taxation in sample cou ntries with low and
high levels of indebtedness.
Empirical studies of the Ricardi an equiva lence hypothesis take many forms . Several economists
tested for Ricardian equiva lence usin g con sumption functions, such as Da1amgas (1994), in which
a measur e of governme nt debt or the deficit has been included as a regressor (Whee ler 1999: 274) .
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Dalamagas (1994) indicated that the ability of deficit financing to affect economic activity could
be assessed by estimating a consumption function in which the household income, government
spending and the government defic it are included as fiscal explanatory variables. The simple
equation is shown below:
(24)
where Y, represent s the before-tax gross domestic product, C, the total government spending and D,
the budget deficit (the subscript f refers to time period).
Dalamagas estimates this equation in two separate stages. In the first stage, expected values E'_I 1'"
E,_I C, and E'_I D,are gen erated by running an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of Y,. C, and
D, on itself lagged by one or more periods and on the price level, the monetary base and the
government bond yield with various lags. In the second stage, the values of E'_I 1',. E,_I C, and E'_ID
generat ed are then used to estimate equation ( 19). Therefore, the final form of the consumption
function to be estimated is the following:
(2 5 )
The param eters that are attached to equ ation (20) are an important addition as the estimates can be
used to determine the impact of fiscal policy on private sector behaviour and, thus, test the validity
of the Ricardian theorem .
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According to Dalam agas ( 1994: 11 99). government expe nditure sho uld have a negative effe ct on
con sumption und er Ricard ian equiva lence. i.e. - 1 :5- {[] < 0, (given that the governme nt output.
which is composed of a number of cons umption-type goo ds , is ass ume d to be full y va lued by the
private sec tor). From the ory. it is expected that thi s situation wo uld arise , as an increase in
governme nt expendi ture means the government is spe nding on goods that essentially household
consumers would have to pay for. Co nsumers are relati vely wealthier and should therefore be able
to consume more . However. accordin g to Ricard ian equivalence theory, believing that an incre ase
in government spending now will mean higher taxes in the future, the household consumer prefers
not to co nsume at the expense of ' his/her childre n' but rather to increase his/her savings so as to
leave the same bequests (i.e. there is co nce rn for the heir ' s we lfare) . It is ex pected that as a
precaution risk-adverse rational consume rs tend to save more and the present sav ings of the
household cons umer does not perfectly offset his/her future taxes. Thus acco rd ing to Dalam agas
( 1994 : 1199) governme nt spending should have a negative effect on con sumption und er Ricardian
equiva lence .
The coe fficient on budget deficit G ] measures the extent to which the future tax liabilities. impli ed
by defi cit s. are dis counted by the priv ate sector. It is thus expected that perfect discounting of
future taxes means in essence that taxpayers will not consume at the expense of their heirs , but wi ll
rath er incre ase thei r sav ings so as to leave the same bequ ests (as discussed in theory above) . In
thi s case. {[] should be zero if the Ricardian hypothesis is to hold . In contrast to this. supporters of
the traditional Keynesian view argue that a higher level of defi cit, and thus lower taxes. induces
indi viduals to incre ase the ir co nsumption level so that a3is grea ter than zero (a ] >0 ).
T2
5.6.2 Empirical Analysis A
In the initia l empirical ana lysis A, using South African data the study is made more current than
the Dalamagas study by extending the data range to 1998. Expected values with different
var iables2* to those used in the original study were also chose n. It is important to note that one
wo uld have more confidence in the original Dalamagas (1994) result s if it could be show n that
they were not sensitive to the calcul ation of the expected va lues of income, government
expenditure and the fiscal defici t.
The consumption function estimated in th is study utilises data on household income, government
spe nding and the governme nt deficit (outstanding government debt ) as exp lanatory variables. as in
the Dalamagas ( 1994) model described above. The consumption function used in the emp irical
analys is. using South African macroeconomic data. is therefore:
(26 )
Where : C is actual final household consumption, Y, is adjusted disposabl e household income. G[ is
current expenditure of general government and 0 1 is sav ing of general government (all at current
prices). Government sav ings D. is used as proxy for Dalamagas ' deficit coefficient, as ' nega tive'
sav ing impli es a deficit.
2 · With till:quarterly data. we followed the origina l study and used the variables as suggested in Dalamagas ( 1994)
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The variables above (see App end ix: Table 1 for full data sets) are all at current pric es, which is not
an appropriate measure of the eco nomic var iables ove r tim e. as the data also refl ects pn ce
increases (inflation) . Th erefore the real va lue of the data is ca lculated using an implicit pn ce
deflator (Botha et al 1995: 36 ). In other words, all the above variables are converted using a price
deflator to constant 1995 prices (See Appe ndix: Tables :2 and 3).
The final speci fied equation used in this econometric analysis utili sed expec ted values or forecasts,
which can be defined as theoretical va lues occurr ing in an ideali sed situation so that. in reality.
slight variations from these expected va lues are norm al (Bless and Kathuria 1993: 88). Estimated
values Ei., YI, £1-1 Gr and Et- I D, were generated by running an ordinary least squares (OL S)
regression of (YI , GI , DI ) on itsel f lagged by one per iod, and on other variables . It is important to
note that unlike Dalamagas ( 1994) th is model used many more variab les to predict eac h expected
value . Amo ngst oth ers, foreign investm ent. exports and tran sfers were included (See App end ix:
Ta bles 4. 1 and 4.2) . Once the equations were estimated, they were used to forecast values at r/. Cl
and DI and these becom e the expected va lues.
Eco nometric Data Analysis Techn ique
In this econome tric study , the DOS -operated S'I-IAZAM 8.0 Vers ion co mputer pack age is used.
Ass umptions on the validity of the Ricardian theorem with regard to the a2and a, coe ffic ients were
tested in this ana lysis by using a Bayesi an (Geweke) Inequalit y Co nst rained Estimation. A Monte
Carlo simulation exercise is then run in orde r to ca lculate the proportion of restrictions satis fied
and the final est imated regression values.
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Mon te Carlo Stu dy
The eco nometric technique used in assessing the above econometric model is the Mo nte Carlo
study, which is essentially a computer simulation or sampling experime nt (Gujarati 1995: 84 ). A
Monte Carlo study can be further described as a simulation exe rcise designed to highli ght the small
sample distr ibuti on prope rties of compet ing estimators for a spec ific estimating problem . These
studies are called upon wheneve r, for that particular problem , there exist potentially attractive
estimators whos e sma ll-sample prope rties cannot be derive d theoreticall y. Estimators with
unknown sma ll-sample properties are regularly being proposed in eco nomic literature. so Monte
Car lo studies are commo n. now that computer techn ology has become more affordab le.
The process beh ind a Monte Carlo study can be outlined in four phases:
1. Modelling the data-generating process
This phase invo lves the simulation of the process thought to be generat ing the real-world data for
the problem at hand. This essentially involves building a model for the computer to mim ic the
data-generating process , including its stochast ic components .
2. Crea ting sets of data
This phase involves the generat ion of several sets of art ific ial data. With a model of the data-
generating process built into the computer. artificia l data can be created . This artificially genera ted
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set of sample data can be viewed as an exa mple of real-world data tha
t a researcher would use
when faced with the kind of estimation probl em this model represent s.
By creating data from a
model. we know we can eva luate how alternative estim ation procedures
work under a variety of
conditions (Griffiths et al 200 1: 287).
3. Calculation of several estimates
The artific ial data is employed to create seve ral estim ates. The process
is repeated a numb er of
times (e .g. 5 000 times) to obtain the same amount of estimators. For ex
am ple, each of the 5 000
repeated samples is used as data for the a, est imators, creating, say, 5 000 estima
ted a.; (i = L 2.. .
5 000) of eac h a, parameter. The 5 000 estimates can therefore be viewed
as random 'drawings'
from the sampling distribution of each a, parameter.
4. The estimation of sampling distribution properti es
The random drawings from the samp ling distribution of the parameters (i
.e. ai) can be finally used
as data to estimate the properties of the sampling distributi on .
Bayesian (Geweke) Inequality Constrained Estimation
The validity of Ricardi an ass umptions was determ ined by testing for the t
raditional case regardin g
the coe ffic ients a: and ([3 using inequality restrictions (explained later). The
Bayes command used
in SHAZAM 8. 0 Version provides a procedure for estimation with an inequa
lity restriction . The
Bayesian Inequality Constra ined Estimation method, introd uced by John
Geweke (1986), uses a
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Monte Carlo numerical integration procedure that is implemented by generating replications from
a multi variate t distribution (White 1997: 115).
The inequality constrained estimates and standard errors are reported as the mean and standard
deviation of the values that satisfy the inequality restrictions. If one assumes that R is the number
of repli cations and s is the number that satisfies the restrictions, the "proportion " (See Appendix
No .2) is computed as P = s / R and this gives the probability that the restrictions are true (White
1997: 115). The "numerical standard error of proportion " (a standard error for numerical
accuracy) is computed as the square root of P (l-P) / R. The data set with the label "numerical se"
is the standard devi ation of the mean computed as the standard deviation divided by the square root
ofs.
process and Results (See Appendix)
The initial step in the empirical testing for Ricardian equivalence using equation (26) is to model
the data-generating proc ess . The model -generating process invol ves the creation of three models.
These models include adjusted disposable household income (b), adjusted government expenditure
(c) and adju sted saving (or deficit) of general government (d). Individual model s were generated
by lagging each variable b. c and d on itsel f. This modeling process is programmed in SHAZAM
8.0 Version as:
genr I b=l a g( b)
ge n r lc=l a g(c)
ge nr I d=l a g( d)
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Predicted values for adj usted disposable household income (b), adjusted government expenditure
(c) and adjusted savi ng (or deficit ) of general government (d) are then regressed using ordinary
least squares COLS) on the variable s used to foreca st income Y, (See Appendix: Tables 4.1 and
4.2.) Thi s process is also programmed in SHAZAM 8.0 Version as:
?o l s b l b e f 9 h / p r ed i ct =ey
?o ls e le i j k / p rediet=eg
?o l s d Id I m n / pred ict =e d
where:
b - is regressed on itse lf lagged by one period and on variables e, f, g and h
c - is regressed on itself lagged by one period and on variables i, j and k
d - is regressed on itself lagged by one period and on variables I, m, and n
Two constra ints/res trictions are then tested on the data obtained in the mann er above. Here.
Dalamagas' assumptions are tested on the va lidity of the Ricardi an theorem , with regard to the
coeffi cients ([;: and ([3 . Instead of testin g the validity of the interva l - 1 .:::;..., (I ;: < 0 for Ricardi an
equivalence. we rather test the simp ler a: hypothesis ([] 2: 0 that is expec ted to exist under
traditional theory . Dalam agas (1994: 11 99), when referr ing. to the (1 3 coefficient, indi cated that a
higher level of deficit induces individua ls to increase their consumption, in the traditional case,
where (1 3 ) O. When testing for the traditi onal case in our model , however , government sav ings is
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used as a proxy for Dalamagas ' defic it coe fficient and our inequ ality (a3 < 0) is therefore
exp ressed as the oppos ite of Dalamagas' ( 1994), as 'negative' sav ing implies a deficit in this case.
Inequ alit y restri ctions are programmed in SHAZAM 8.0 Version as :
r es t r i c t eg . ge .O
r e s t r i c t ed . lt . O
(Se e Appendix No.1 for the entire SHAZAM 8.0 Version command file.)
The result s indi cate that at 10 000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation, only 4 percent of the
restrictions are satisfied. (See Appendix : No. 2, for all results/output.) The results of the Monte
Carlo simulation run on the Bayesian restrictions indicate that South African consumers may be
Ricardi an in their behaviour. Restriction inequaliti es in support of the trad itional case are thus
rejected. Of the 10 000 replic ations only 40 7 satisfy the trad itional case 's inequalities. We set up
the test in such a way so as to compare the traditional mod el with the Ricardian one. The
inequalities whi ch we test and reject are those of the traditi onal model. We therefore find. in an
indirect mann er. some support for the Ricardi an view on the basis of the test here.
Lawrence Bolands 1996 paper on realism in eco nomic modeling suggests that there are concerns
around the reliance on the so-called axiom of the excluded middle. This axiom says that to be
admiss ible into a logical arg ument. a statement cannot be both true and false. That is, there is no
third status such as a probability value. Boland ( 1996) arg ues that most econometricians directly
contrad ict the axiom. Any argument or proof that involves an ass umption that is considere d neither
abso lutely true nor abs olutely false cannot be used to provide an indirect proof. The so-ca lled
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subjectivist approach to economics such as in Bayesian econometrics falls into this category. This
is not to say that Bayesian economics needs to be rejected but rather Bayesian econometrics should
not be used in a model that provides an indirect proof of some important economic proposition.
Despite this objection we examine the two estimated coefficients.
In this Bayesian env ironment. we have two comp eting hypotheses. In this thesi s consumers are
either considered to be Ricardi an in their beha vior or they are con sidered to behave in a manner
consistent with the traditi onal model. But given the Bayesian nature of the technique there is the
possibility that there is no 'excluded middle ' and it would not be possible to say that either
competing hypothesis is true or it is possible to say either is true foll owing the Boland critique. In
Figure E below. the "excluded middl e ' is shown as the shaded area. Therefore to say that the data
in this thes is fail s the test s for the traditional model does not imply acceptance of the Ricardian
model due to the problem of the ' excluded middl e'. This is one objection to the tests as we have
constructed them in this section. Therefore we try to do additional testing in Section 5.6.3.
The coefficient on the budget deficit (([3), which is a fraction less than zero, supports the restr iction
results by indicating that for a higher level of deficit (or in our case a lower level of gove rnment
saving), there is no significant impact on consumption. The ([3 coefficient in our model indic ated a
slight decrease in consumptio n. The reaso n for this decrease may be that rational consumers may
decrease consum ption only slightly after a tax cut and save more as a precautionary measure. in
ant icipation of future taxes (i.e. taxpayers in this case ove r capital ise their future obligations that
publi c debt issue embodies) . The stated view is that C i- f (Y) supports Ricardian Equivalence.
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Go vernment spending should have a negative effect on pr ivate sector behaviour (i .e. privat e
consumption. - I :S..- a: < 0). rath er than a pos itive effec t in the traditional case. From the regression
results. the government spending coefficient is close to I . which, in contrast to the restriction
results. seems to support traditi onal the ory, as the coefficient sho ws that for a I unit increase in
governme nt spending private consumption will increase by I unit ceteris paribus. The main reason
why the Bayesian test does not support the traditional case is because of the coefficient on the
bud get deficit (as) is negative. which is the oppos ite of the traditional Keynesian view that argues
that a higher level of de ficit , and thus lower taxes, induces individuals to increase their
con sumption level so that as is grea ter than zero (a] >0). So it appears that the bud get defi cit effect
outweighs the government expenditure effect.





An addi tive relat ion ship can be developed: C = f (Y. G + D) if I is stable Y = C + G + I + D. When
obse rv ing the O LS regression results. we notice that there is a high R2 va lue of 0.9948. The R2 in
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the case of thi s model measures the proportion or percentage of the total value of household
consumption explained by the regres sion model (Gurajati 1999: 172). An R] of 1 means a ' perfect
fit' for the entire variation of dependent variable explained by the regre ssion. Therefore at 0.9948
the model that is specifi ed in this case has a 'good fit ' . To analyse the relati onship between the
household consumption variable and the independent variables of the regression , individual I tests
were conducted. When dividing the coeffici ent s by the numerical standard error term. attained
after running the Monte Carlo simulation and Baye sian Inequality Constrained Estimation. we
obtain calculated I values . As the calcul ated I values are greater than the critic al I values. in each
case the null hypothesis is rejected (with 95% confidence). Thi s means , for this data . a higher
deficit is associated with lower consumption, and thus supportive of the Ricardian case.
Regression models involving time senes data, however. sometimes produce results that are
'spurious', or of dubious value. in a sense that superficially the results may look good (i.e.
extremely high R] and significant I ratio s), but on further investigation they may look suspect (e.g .
with respect to a low Durbin Watson d value) (Gujarati 1999: 455 ). To understand why the
regression results of thi s study may be spurious. it is necessary to briefly introduce the concept of
stationary time series. Broadly speaking. ' a stochastic process ' is said to be stationary if its mean
and variance are constant ove r time and the value of the covarian ce (expected value of how two
variables vary or move together) between two time periods, depends only on the distance or lag
between the two time periods and not on the actual time at which covariance is computed. The
.stochastic or random process' refers to the economic model generating the time series variable Y,
(Griffiths et al 2001 : 335). If a time series is not stationary in the sense just defined, it is called a
nonstationary time series . ' Nonstationarity' can have severe econometric consequences resulting in
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unreli able least squares estimators. test statistics and predictors, and thus the regre ssion results may
'spurio usly' indicate a significa nt relationship when there is none.
As a problem relating to time series data, the problem of possible 'spurious results ' and stationarity
is synonymous with the issue of autocor relation. The term autocorrelati on in the modeling of time
series data may be defin ed as the correlation between members of a series of observations ordered
in time (Gujarati 1988: 353). When we have time series data , where the observations follow a
natural ordering through time, as in the case of this econometric study, there is always a possibility
that successive errors will be correlated with each other (Gr iffiths 2001 : 258). To test for
autoc orrelation in our model the Durbin-Watson test named after its inventors Durbin and Watson
(1950) , was util ised . This test which remains one of the most important tests for testing for
autoc orrelati on. was programmed into SHAZAlv! 8.0 Versi on as Rsta t . (See Appendix: No. 1.)
The Durbin-Watson d value at 2.349 (See Appendix: No.2) means that under the null hypothesis of
no autoco rrelation, there is no evidence of positive first-order serial correlation, No autocorrelation
was implied. because given the sampl e size of 53 and the number of explanatory variables-
(excluding the constant term). the Durbin-Wat son d value falls outside the upper limit, at a 0.05
level of significance.
The high Durbin-Watson d value may therefore indicat e that the 'stochastic process' is stationary
and that there is zero autocorrelation so that the regression result s are ' non-spurious' . This
indicates that the regression model may thus hold true in its supp ort of Ricardian equi valence.
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Test Analys is Conclusion
The results of empirical analysis A that uses a Bayesian Inequality Const
rained Estimation rejects
the trad itional proposition, indicating that there is a possibility that S
outh African consumers
(1946-1 998) may not consume at the expense of the ir heir s, but rather m
ay increase their savings,
so as to leave bequests in a Ricardian or near Ricard ian manner. This
result is a repli cation of
Dalamagas' (1994) results.
5.6.3 Empirical Analysis B
In the empirical analysis of the previous section, we found some support f
or Ricardian equiva lence
as increasing the deficit reduces consumption . This surprising result needs
greater scrutiny. Thu s
we decide to 'replicate' the Dalamagas result showing support for Ricard ia
n equivalence in South
Africa.
Annual statistical macroeconomi c data of South Africa (53 observations
) from 1946 to 1998 are
considered in the first empirical anal ysis (See Appendix). However, th
is second analysis. like
Dalamagas' (1994) study, uses quarterl y data, but unlik e Dalamagas' s stu
dy where the tim e series
started in 1971 and ends in 1992. the repli cation is done for the period
1974 to 2002. To add an
additional element of confirm ation we also performed the second emp
irical study with a time
series of annual data for the years 1946-1998.
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Developing the Model: A Short Primer on Ricardian Equivalence
The following assumptions are made in this analysis:
1. The money stock is not changing and the price level is within a target range.
2. The government has in mind a level of real government expenditures to be made each year.
Let us call these expenditures cg..
3. Init ially the government has no debt. Calling debt dg, in effect we are sayi ng dg, is equal to
zero.
The government's budget constraint in real terms is:
(27 )
which, allowing for no debt in the previous period . is:
(28)
So if cg, is fixed then increasing dg,will mean that t or real taxes can fall by an equal amount. This
means for eve ry increase in dg, disposable income rises. One option for the government is to
reduce dg back to zero in each and every subse quent period from now on but still having to pay
back dg, with inte rest in the subsequent year. So the overall rea l macroeconom ic impact after
discounting is:
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-dg + ldK( I+r ) ) /( I+1') or - I + ldg( I+r )) /( I+r ) (2 9 )
which is zero . In other words consum ers kno w that the lower tax es today mean higher taxes in the
future and they save just enough to pay these higher taxes with interest. It is the government bond
that pro vid es the vehicle for saving just the right amount. This is a tidy and simple statement of the
Ricardi an equivalence proposition.
If the bond is never repaid and government persi sts in maintaining the debt dg, for all future time
peri ods. consumers kno w they are indebt ed for the interest payments. So the overall real
macroeconomic impact is:
-dt + dg(r ){ 1/( I+r) + 1/( I+r)2+ 1/( I+r)3... ) or
I -,
dg =dg(r){I /(I +r)) {I + 1/(1+1') + 1/(I +rt ... } (31)
and the last term in brackets abo ve reduces to I /r{(l +r)/1) givin g only dg. Again givmg the
Ric ardian result that there are no real effects (-dl + dg) from shifting to a deficit from taxes. as the
impact is zero. What does not always receive emphasis is that under Ricardi an equi valence
changes in governme nt spending do not alter the rate of interest so that investment is not 'crowded
out' as is the case under the traditional view . Thus if polic ymakers are concerne d about investm ent
and growth. they should be supportive of the Ricardi an vie w as then there are fewer impediments
to these processes if thi s view is correct. A lack of Ricardi an behaviour imposes a cost on the
macro economy as the interest rate changes mak es for confusion in investment decisions with an
adverse effect on economic growth.
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Replicating a Previous Result -The Dalamagas Model
It was felt necessary to replicate the Dalamagas (1994) results give n the implication for fisca l
policy. The original study specifi es the consumption function as:
C = + j3 }, el- l + .r: el- I+ 5:V el- ' +
J I a I ( '-' I U I E
(32 )
(33 )
where the independent variable s are the expected values at time t-l of incom e, government
spending and the fiscal defici t. With Ricardian equivalence, the coe ffic ient on E,_,G, should fall
into the range - 1 ~ a ] < 0 as individuals reduce consumption in the face of higher government
consum ption. If indivi dual s discount future taxation changes then changes to EI_,DI should be
acco mpanied by offsetting changes in cons umption. This implies under Ricardian equivalence that
a 3 is expected to be less than zero.
We reprodu ce Dalamagas' result s below.
Coefficients on: a I 0.59
-0.36
-0.28.
and the size and signs of the estimated coeffi cients conform to those expected under Ricardian
equivalence .
87
In the Empirical Analysis B a number of decisions were undertaken in an attempt to replicate the
above results:
1. As discussed above the data sets used are annual data taken fr om 1946. and quarterly data
from 1974 .
2. The study is made mo re current than the one undertaken by Dalamagas ( 1994) with the
annual data taken to 1998 . and quarterly data to 2002.
3. The expected values with different variables to those used by Dalamagas (1994) were
ca lculated with respect to the annual data. With the quarterl y data the original study was
followed and the va riables, as sugg ested in Dal amagas ( 1994), were used. One would have
more confidence in the original results if it could be shown that they were not sensit ive to
the ca lculation of the ex pected values of income. government expenditure and fiscal deficit.
Before estimating the consumption function in Empirica l Analysis B each of the four variables
were examined for non stationarit y.
Variable t-stati stic for unit roo t (95%)
-3 .6753 (-3.4 1)3-
- 1.1990 (-3.4 1)
-1.7888 (-3.41 )
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As not all variables are stationary. one cannot use the usual methods to estimate the consumption
function as the usual t and DW (Durbin-Watson) statistics do not keep their usual feature s when
the data is nonstationary as are two of the variables. Running a regression with such data can
misl ead one to thinking there is a relationship between these variables when in fact no such
relationship exists. Thus we need to look for the number of cointegratin g vectors (called r) in the














Reject r = 0
Accept r = 1
Thu s there is evidence of eo integration and like Dalamagas we find that there is 'at most' one
cointegrating relationship for South Africa. Recent studies have used the full information
maximum likelihood (FIM L) procedure developed in Joh ansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius
(1990) both to test for cointegration and to estimate long-run equilibrium relationship s. The
Joh ansen technique is used in Empirical Analysis B to find the sing le cointegrating relationship







Our results are not 'close' to Dalamagas as the two Ricardian coefficients (a] and aj) are not
consistent with the prior results as we regard the small negative estimate of aj to be hardl y
overwhelm ing support for the Ricardi an view of the deficit.4 * Of the three estimated coefficients
only Cl] is statistically significa nt. There fore as a .' is not different from zero and with a] falling in
the range suggested by the standard model rather than Ricardian equiva lence, we have had
difficult y reproducing the Dalamagas result. Governm ent 'output' is to a large extent not fully
valued by private agents, and lower taxes do change lifetim e expenditures by those same agents
but not to a degree that would make them Ricardian .
5.7 Conclusion
The initial econometric stud y (Empirical Analysis A) tend s to partially support the findin gs of
Dalamagas (1994 ) that countrie s with a high debt to income ratio, like South Africa (1946-1998)
have consumers that are Ricardian in behav iour. However, the result s of the econometric analysis
using the Johansen technique (Empirical Analys is B), in contrast to the initial study, finds little
support for the Ricardian eq uiva lence proposition, indicating that South African consumers (1946-
~ . Using our quarterly data we found two eointegrating vectors. One did not seem to be economica lly meaningfu l. However. another
gave SuppOI1 to our conclusion which In: present here. namely. that we find support for the traditional model. One possible reason
for the change in the South African data is that the deficit as a percentage of output began to fall alter 1992.
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1998 ) may not fu lly value governme nt expenditures but may save to the benefit of their heirs.
when considering tax cuts.
As this Ricardian effect is not strong we are of the op inio n that in thi s case the empirical analys is is
more in support of the theoretica l analysis of the traditional model including the advers e
consequences of ' crowding out" private investm ent . and the resultant deleterious effe ct on growth.
In secti on 5.4 we howeve r argue that it is possible to test a 'view point ' that test s for Ricardian
Equiva lence and is also sens itive to var ious specifi cations. We thu s find that the strong support for
Ricardi an equivalenc e in the Dalamagas cas e changes to support for the traditional model when
conside ring a longer time period in Empirical Analys is B.
Table J: Table showing Estimated Coefficientsfor the Empirical Tests considered in this Study
Method/Approach
Da lamagas Bayesian Averages Repli cat ion




















The two tests (Empirica l Analys is A and B) can be conside red to be in broad agreement. It is
interesting that these two tests use different variables to calcul ate expected values but come up
with similar results. It seems to be the case though , that by changin g the tim e peri od by four years
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changes the measured result s. and in particul ar the biggest change is the coefficient a2. Thus for the
longer sample the consumers are no longer Ricardian in their behaviour.
From empirical analysis A we observed that Government spending in the Ricardian case should
have a negative effect on private sector behaviour (i .e. private consumption, - 1~ a2 < 0). rather
than a positive effect in the traditional case. From the regression results, the government spending
coefficient is close to 1, which, in contrast to the restriction results, seems to support traditional
theory. However thi s test supports the Ricardian case because the coefficient on the budget deficit
although close to zero, (a3) is negative, which is in contr ast to the traditional Keynesian view that
supports a consumption level where (/ 3 is greater than zero. The result s of Analysis A can be
described as pointing towards near-Ricardian behaviour by individuals as the results were not as
'strongly' Ricardian as in the case of Dalarnagas ' test in his 1994 paper.
A furth er attempt was therefore mad e to determine whether the South Afric an population tended
toward Ricardian behaviour as shown in the Dalamagas (1994) article. It was thus decided that
more data (i.e. the quart erly data) would be utlised in Empirical Analysis B as opposed to annual
data that was thus used in the previous analysis. Empirical analysis B shows that the results are
not 'cl ose ' to Dalamagas as the two Ricardi an coefficients (a2 and ( 3) are not consistent with the
prior result s as we regard the small negative estimate of a, to be hardl y overwhelming support for
the Ricardian view of the deficit. Of the three estim ated coeffi cients only (/2 is statistically
significant. Therefore as aJ is not different from zero and with a: fallin g in the range suggested by
the standard model rath er than Ricardian equi valence , we have had diffi culty reproducing the
Dalam agas result. Government ' output' is to a large extent not fully valued by private agents. and
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION S
The analysis of Ricardian equivalence initially identified the Ricardian equiva lence proposition as
being associated with the budget deficit, which is the main feature of fiscal polic y debat es, as
governments use budgets to control their fiscal affai rs. The literature shows that the tradi tional
(Keynesian or Neo-classic al) theory of budget defi cits holds that an increase in government debt
leads to an increase in pr ivate wea lth so that personal savings do not increase, to offset public
sector savings. The fiscal impli cation s of this theory relat e to aggregate consumption being higher
and national savi ngs lower if a government spending program is financed through the issuing of
bonds rather than through current taxation.
However , traditional theory concerning bud get defi cits has recentl y been cast into doubt through
the revival of Ricardi an equivalence theory. The Ricardian modification of the traditional analysi s
begins with the propos ition that if the path of gove rnment expendi tures on goods, services and
transfers is unchanged, then a deficit-financed tax cut or the issuing of bond s leads to an exactly
offsetting increase in the prese nt value of future taxes. It was determin ed from the literature that
economi c agents realise that rising public debt must be repaid at some point in the future and that
in anticipation of future taxes they will save their addi tional incom e after tax cuts. It is under these
circumstances that the ass umption is made that taxation and the issuin g of bonds are an equivalent
means of financ ing government expenditure .
To further understand the above assumption. and the Ricardi an theory behind the assumption. the
behavioural characteristics of consumers were analysed. Ricardi an equivalence was modelled
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within the framework of a two -peri od model where both the indi vidual and the economy are
assumed to exist for just two periods and that any debt incurred in the first period must be paid off
with interest in the second. The modern analysis of Ricardian equivalence , however, refers to each
famil y as a single. infinite-li ved age nt that is linked with all others through operative
intergenerational transfers. Thu s to demonstrate that taxes would not be escaped through death,
Ricardian equi valence was analysed with respect to the overlapping-generations model. where
consumers can be described as living for two periods, but overlapping one period with their
children.
The ana lysis of Ric ardi an equi valence theory has shown that complete Ricardian equi valence
would be expected to prevail only under special conditions/ass umptions. Virtually all arguments
against the equivalency proposition are developed around the theoretical and empirical criticisms
of the ass umptions. as violations of one or more of the assumptions could lead to deviations from
the Ricardian equivalence doctrine. When analysing Ricardian equiva lence, however, it is argued
that the ultimate test of Ricardian equi valence the ory may not nece ssarily be in the plausibility of
all its assumptions but rather in whether or not it leads to predictions confirmed by the data.
Defenders of Ricardian equiva lence argue that the theory is an approx imation and they may claim
that, although all the strict conditions required for complete Ricardian equivalence may not hold,
the economy' s behaviour in practice is clos e to the predictions of Ricardian equiva lence.
The empirica l analysis of Ricardian equiva lence for South African con sumers (1946- 1998) is
based on wo rk done by Dalamagas (1994) concerning the tax versus debt controversy, the level of
indebtedness of countries and Ricardian equi valence. Econometric analyses were conducted with
consumption functions estimated, using predicted values . The analyses aimed to determine
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whether bud get deficits/government debt either affect (traditional view) or do not appreciabl y
affec t (Ricardian equivalence) private consumption.
The results of this initial eco nometric analysis (Empirica l Analys is A) that uses a Bayesian
Inequ ality Constrained Estimation rejects the traditi onal proposition , indi cating that there IS a
possibil ity that South African consumers ( 1946- 1998) may be Ricardian. On closer inspection of
the results it is clear they are not a replication of Dalamagas' s 1994 results. One can rather describe
the test results as indicating near-Ricardi an beha viour by indi viduals as the results were not as
'strongly' Ricardian as in Dalarnagas ' case.


















A further attempt was therefore made to determine whether the South African population tended
toward Ricardi an behaviour as shown in the Dalamagas (1994) art icle. It was decided that more
data (i.e. the quarterly data) would need to be utli sed in Empirica l Analysis B as opposed to annual
data that was used in the previous analysis. Empirical analysis B shows that the results are not
'close' to Dalamagas as the two Ricardian coe fficients (a2 and ( 3) are not consistent with the
prior result s as we regard the small negative estimate of a3 to be hardl y ove rwhelming support for
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the Ricardian VIew of the deficit. Thus Dalamagas' results are sensitive to the number of
observations in the sample.
The results of Empirica l Anal ysis B using the Johansen technique thus found little support for the
Ricardian equivalence proposit ion. indicating that South African consumers (1946-1998 ) do not
fully value government expenditures, but may save to the benefit of their heirs when considering
tax cut s. As this latter effect is not strong we are of the opinion that the empirical anal ysis here
supports the theoretical analysis of the traditional model including the adverse consequences of
' crowding out' private investment , and the resultant deleterious effect on growth.
Empirical research is essential in providing answers to the theoretical questions concernmg
Ricardian equi valence. However. although the ultimate test of the economic theory is whether or
not it leads to predictions that are confirmed by the econometric results, the brief explanation of
empirical research and analysis above, reveal s irregular proof of Ricardian equi valence. According
to the revie w of literature, complete Ricardi an equiva lence seems to however. be expected to
prevail only under special conditions or assumptions.
.It has also been argued that if one compares consumption function studies it is noted that
seemingly minor changes in specification (such as sampl e size) can dramatically alter the empirical
result s. Thi s thesis , considerin g the relevance of Ricardian equivalence to the South African
situation. also reveals irregul ar Ricardian results from the two empirical analyses conducted using
the same South African data sets.
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Price deflator calculation:
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195 5 11 5 63 5 12 '12 17 6 20 8
8 1 . 7 L1 ~, 6 7 0 . 637
1 95 6 11B401 1.;'7 3713 . B n08 7
~) ~i 3 71 . 62
195 7 1231 48 . .3 13;: 935 . 4 2:14
07 . 32 662 2 . 853
19 58 12 60 '12 1331 :' 8 2
33 28 532 8
19 59 131830 . 9 1 4 1 ~-j07 .2 2 4 6
27 . 3 4 68 02 . 531
196 0 130 45 8 . 1 13 917 3 . 6 24 2
59 . 3 1 696 5 . 544
1 96 1 127 926. H 14:3
L14 2 . Cl 2473 4 9 4 73 9 . 23 3
196 2 132 16 4
, ] 'il ':,) 9 2H31 1 El ~j l'78 9 . 46 1
"
1 96 3 1347f33 . 9 1:,]CJ8 lJ .4
29 3:<'5 . "r:; 83 18 . 508I .)
1964 146 407 1',(3041. 3 32 '168
95 8 191 . 43 4
1 96 5 1496 46 . C) 16 1. 9~)
~ --J • ] 34 T1 9 . ;' 8 674 6 . 954
1966 1571 Cl3 17 .n 1 ( l . b 376
29 .29 ~i0 28 17
196 7 1 65 90 '] q 1 E3] '1? 6 39 % 0
. 7 5 11 0 60 . 33
1 968 179 99 7 ~~ () 11 9 I) b 432 82
. El2 10 4 68 . 28
1 96 9 1877 8 fl ~~ on f3 H•
') 47 53 7 08 10850 . 33
.. ' L
1 970 1 97 457 -, ;~ lD8:)3 .
C' si sao 87 9 4 117t•• l
1971 2 13 U38 . 6 ? :;; '1 ~) o4 1 5AB02 . ~) 1 403 1. 17
1
197 2 22 3665 .2 ~~ ::'~~ 14 ~~) .
r, 59962 . 1 58 60 . 494L .
1 973 2 37 45 7 6 ;: '::,3 1 ')6 . B 626
46 . 7 B ] 6637 03
19 74 2 48 942 . 6 270278 1 71 1 91
35 187 61 13
197 5 2 5163 7 9 27 37 ::,8 4 804
65 . 16 9 40 2 . 3 4
197 6 2 4 91 41 . 9 2 63 63 9 . 1 8 64
39 . 88 1 926 . 921
1 977 2 50 438 1 ? E~ l) ~~) 6 . ? 8 9978
9 1 12 50 . 3 62
1 97 8 2 5138 6 . ~) 2 "1 ~' 7 8 7 91
4 6 1 6:) 382 4 . 2 17
1 97 9 2 5 67 60 . H:UO .
,.' 9 ')2] J 1 11 7 8 19]
1980 2 66024 29BC)t12 . 1 100
27 9 . l 121 66 . 9
'e98 1 28 7 67 ';
L 2 97 33 ] 9 104 666 . j 673 3 . 558J
1982 28 6224 . 2 2 940 6?
I 11 54 06 . 7 - 5133. 2 9J
1983 286 396 . 3 2 9 1 El O' , . :3 11 5
88 1 4 - 5907 93
19 84 301 69 3 31939 6 .7 132
008 7 - 12 785
1985 2 87 925 . ~) 3 ;:0 9:'. 4 3
U7 93 5 . 7 - 11 454 . 8
198 6 2 9326Cl . Cj 3 1029 '-l . 4
1414 83 . 7 - 14417
r;
.J
1 987 30 1;2 89 J 2F~ 1~) H . ·J
1,1"1 48 1 (, - 1974 6 . 2
1 988 32 Wi 8 El 3£1;:19 '7
Cl 1 L177 7 9 .
., - 13176. 1. )
198 9 320 ;:22- • .L 3 4;~388 9
l:i 499 '/ 6 - 13 2 36 . 7
19 90 37 90 3 4 9 3Elf116 6 . 5
1 ~j 47 99 . 8 - 124 62 . 4
1991 37 5707 . b 38/173 1 8
1 ~ j :: 502 . 9 - 1602 6 . 5
199 2 37 10 'J3 . 1 38 91.31 . 7
1 6;: 26 3 . 9 - 372 67 . 2
:993 3677 7 1
> -\
~ ,~;. >: ~.) (: -\ (; 1 (,:~ ~~ 2 1. 1 - 3455 7 3
1994 3779(16 . 8
:Ji; i ?9Q . <'1 H, 77 0 4
, - 312 50 . 6I
:995 388461 11
39 4673 ~) 162 555 . 6
- 2 3 12 8 1
1 9 9 6 40 48 45
11 11t1 5D <) 17 7 72
') - 28 1 3 5 7L .
199 7 425223
4 3 1 2 ~) ·1 4 IHl726 . 1 - 2
8 5 8 4 8
1 9 98 42 589 9 . 3
4 '}., , ' ) 1:"_ El
I 1B3081 3 - 2 3 0 0 5 5_-, .L iL _.! -l
Source: South Africa 's National Ac
counts I i).jo 1998. Supplement to
the So uth African Reserve
Bank Quarterly Bull etin June 1999.
Table 5.1: Vari ables used inforecast ing )',. Foreign inves tment. Exports ofgoods. Exports of
services. Primary incomefrom the rest ofthe world Datafor South Africa at current prices in R
millions
Da te F .lnves( cp) Expgds(cp) Expservs(cp) PriY( cp) Impgds(cp)
1 9 4 6 18 5 .27 7 1 5 7 6 43 8
1947
I
3 78 3 1 6 17 5 7 60 7
I
1 94 8 343 33 2 ?4 5 9 7 16
I ::. 9 4 9 2 5 3
35 7 ; ~ ') 4 I 9 6 3 8
I 19 S0 5 8 )') ') 4 6 3 I 11 62 1I
I 1951 2 8 7 3 1') I) (in 19 95 3I
1 9 5 2 19 1 39 8 :i 91 2 3 8 50
1 9 5 3 1 8 5 19 6 i s 24 8 6 7
19 54 1 37 c,34 li 7 t3 28 90 0
195 5 134 5 5 '! 674 31 9 88
1 9 5 6 6 0 'i 9 6 ~l 5 -/ 34 10 1 5
19 57 6 0 6 "1:· B ~) 1 3 5 1127L. .J
~ . 958 1 7 9 6 4 3 ne 3 :3 11 4 7
19 ::9 - 1 3 2 6 5 /t H93 ,13 1 0 1 6
1960 - 3 4 1 416 1 aa 4 6 11 4 1
196 1 - 1 9 6 1 4 9:> 1% 48 10 3 1
1962 - 3 0 8 1 ::,8 3 208 5 5 1 0 5 7
1963 - 1 4 9 1705 no 5 5 130 5
19 6 4 1 0 2 1786 247 73 1605
1 96 5 3 6 6 181 1 ;) 60 7 4 1 8 30
196 6 1 0 2 19 3;? ;>8 8 7 9 167 9
196 7 26 6 ~. o 4 "7 3 ::,0 1 04 1977
1968 11 2 25 0 ,1 0 2 1 08 1925
1969 3 4 2 2 2 9.1) '123 1 2 5 2 188
1970 9 1 9 2? 6 :~ i1 BS 129 2 62 1
1 97 1 1 0 61 2 486 li 6 8 1 5 0 2 9 6 0
1 972 1 4 3 334 9 6 3 H 171 28 9 1
1 9 7 3 16 9 LJ 1 9 I) l e ", 264 3 6 11.) I
1 974 9 7 9 574 7 % 9 21 0 58 0 6
: 975 176 6 en1 12 4 9 2 3 1 677 8
1976 1 6 5 4 72 3"1 l? 6 7 322 747 5
1 9"17 - 2 0 9 8E:9? 144 -f 23 7 6 927
I
197 8 - 9 4 9 ] 09 7 0 1711 34 4 8 1 0 5
1 97 9 - 2 5 0 4 1 4 ,18 3 19 8 7 48 0 9 8 5 2
1 98 0 - 2 5 5 4 1 9 7 E , 23 0 0 44 7 1 4 2 8 8
198 1 4176 1 8 12 4 2 56 4 4 77 1 8 2 5 3
1 9 82 3 55 7 1 8 7 8 2 3 0 81 513 1 8 04 2
198 3 4 2 8 ~: OO) O 2 9 ~~j ~: J 734 1 58 94
198 4 2 5 17 ~ : 11 ,16 H " ~ . ., 105 8 21 4 8 1~ ,)' 1 I
198 5 - 5 2 0 8 ~-: r., ;2 0 4 4 ,19,1 1 ,:, 23 2 2 8
2. 98 6 - 6 32 8 4 C1 64 1 4 H6 "! n 15 2 58 2 6
1 9 8 7 - 67 0 8 4 3430 51 9 7 n S9 28 6 0 6
1988 - 3 3 8 3 51826 6 064 2 820 39 408
198 9 - 3 4 6 7 :)7 52 4 8497 3 0 4 5 44 2 6 6
1 9 9 0 - 5 3 2 2 6 09 1 2 98 C ~ ~ 154 5 43 4 0 8
1 9 9 1 - 62 4 4 6 :,7 34 88 0 3 .2 4 1 4 4 7 4 66
I199 2 - 5 5 5 1 (,98 3 7 9 6? 2 64 9 5 197 6
19 93 367771 .' 3 i;; ~ ,':o1 6 1(,;) 22 1 1 - 34 5 57 3
:.. 9 94 3 7 7 9 4 6 . E, 3E; ! ;:: 99 . 9 1(, 770 4 1 - 312 5 0 . 6
1 99 5 3 884 61 !: 3 94 673 .::l 16 25 5 5 . 6 - 2 3 12 8 . 1..
1 9 96 404845 4 1":450 . 9 177 72 . 2 - 2 8 13 5 . 7
1 9 97 42 52 )3 'I 1 )? ~) '7 4 1HI 726 . 1 - 2 8 5 8 4 . 8
19 98 425 8 99 . :1 4 3112", . 6 1 83 0 81 . 3.-1 - 2 3 0 05. 5
Source: Sou th Africa 's National A CCOlll1rS /1J-!6 - /1J98. Supplement to the South African Reserve
Bank Quarterl y Bulletin June 1999.
Table 5.2: Variable s used inforecasting }'" Import s ofservices, Primary incom
e to the rest ofthe
world, Transfers (net receipts). Net capital inflowfrom the rest oft he wor
ld, Change in gold and
otherforeign reserves - Datafor Soulh Afr ica at current prices in R millio
ns
Date Mservs (cp) PriY(cp)- - . - Trans
(c p ) l Nc a P l n f (c p) G+F .Re s (cp)
----- - - - .._- -"- _._ - .
: 9 4 6 78 9 3 - 16
98 8 7 I
j 94 7 103 9 4 I - 7 2
Y l 6
., IL
194 8 119 lC)f, 1 4
PI 172
1949 112 1 ~: )
- 1 ]1 6 ~ 3 7
195 0 113 1:) 9 L .
20 1 ·· 1 43
195 1 151 ] 8 6 6
215 72
1 9 5 2 l6 4 2 0 0 1 1
P 6 15
19 5 3 1 6 1 2 06 11
1 31 54
1954 16 2 2 2 6 1 1
225 - 8 8
1 955 179 2 46 1 7
CJ2 42
1956 178 2 7 4 20
8 4 - 2 4
19 5 7 1 96 2 65 17
- 3 6 3
19 58 ] 93 2 67 19
17 1 8
] 95 9 173 ~: t: ~l 16 -
2 5 - 10 7
1 96 0 171 :298 - 6
- 2 0 3 1 69
1 96J 1 67 33 0
- J ~) - 11 2 - 8 4
1 962 181 3 07 7
- 8 5 - 2 2 3
1 96 3 23 4 3D]
<j - fJ7 - 6 2
1964 260 3:,8
1 :-, - 2 9 131
1. 965 30 6 3%
'"}1 2 47 11 9L .1
1966 328 ,~? 4 30
158 - 5 6
1 967 368 4 62 40
1 95 71
196 8 39 9 51 8
71 5 45 - 5 3 4
19 69 456 59 9
'j 1 2 77 6 5
1970 5 68 6 5~: 28
5 B4 3 35
1 97 1 6 69 6 7 4 1 6
7 91 2 7 0
1972 677 776 17
115 4 - 3 11
1 97 3 7 95 9 88 - 2
f3 5 8 1 11
1974 1032 11 48 33
7 98 1 8 1
1 97 5 135 0 14£: 0 :31
1741 2 5
1 97 6 1320 17 65 3 1
11 3 2 52 2
1 977 5806 18 96 - 65
- 55 8 3 49
1 97 8 182 6 ? 2?1
~ , - 1 - 913 - 3 6- _' ) I
1 97 9 2117 ;~ 6 2 4 - 4
- 2 4 8 8 - 1 6
1 980 2 7 2 0 31t:6 11
3 - 1 96 8 - ~) 86
1 98 1 3 6 2 8 379 ] 70
3 ] 6 9 10 0 -;
1. 98 2 3911 ,1 1. Cl ;:; -
~~ O ;-~ 44 7 /1 - 917
198 3 3 7 0 0 4 69 2 -
2:2i) 1 :)0 11 - 1 0 7 6
1 98 4 44 50 5713 - 3 5 3
1 62 8 8 89
] 985 5 3 18 f3 2 0 1 - 3 :3 8
- 6 4 4 4 1236
2- 98 6 6 4 1 3 9n ~) - 42
6 - 7 4 8 1 115 3
1 987 6 5 81 9 45 2 - :'J 7
6 - 4 8 2 3 - 1 8 8 5
1 98 8 7619 1 03 92 - 5 2
3 - 5 0 6 3 1 68 0
1 989 91 8 3 l:23 ~)5 - 5 P
- 2 0 7 8 - 1 38 9
1 9 9 0 10 6 3 8 1307 4 - 7 9 9
- /14 4 5 - 8 7 -;
19 9 j 10552 11~: 1 3 - 14 .l6
- 3 17 4 - 3 0 7 0
1 99 2 1 2 428 1] O ~) O - 10
4 3 --4 17 9 - 1372
1 9 9 3 15405 1 09 86 - :! O
9 3 - 6 3 5 5 1 48 7
1 99 4 1 80 7 2 1 2 0 ", 4 - 1 ~) 9 2 13 -; - 2 4 -7 5
: 9 9 5 21 6 6 6 :1. (~ 5 ::J::) - J 4 1 11 270 - 3 27 8
1 99 6 2 4 681 lflO4 ? - 3 >: 0 4 30 17 :i1 0 Cl
: 997 27 7 5 8 L280e - >,3 2 9 2 9 3 78 - 1 8 9 5 1
1 99 8 30 208 ;~ 39 3 6 - ·I(n e 1 2 1 4 2 - 5 1 2
- -- - -- - - - - - -
So urce: So uth Africa 's National Accounts / 1)-16 - J998. Supplement to the South Afr ican Reserve
Ban k Quarterly Bull etin June 1999 .
